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31. Foreword 
Big Lottery Fund’s Big Potential programme emerged from a clear understanding that charities and 
social enterprises needed the right kind of support to achieve their ambitions for the communities they 
work with.
This evaluation of the fourth year of Big Potential Breakthrough (BPB) demonstrates how the activity of 
this landmark initiative has supported that original vision and has helped those organisations do more.
This fourth year review is the first BPB evaluation that has taken place after the programme’s 
completion in February 2018. It is, therefore, the first opportunity to look back at the programme in its 
entirety: the successes and the challenges in a time of rapid change for the whole of the social sector.
BPB engaged a wide variety of charities and social enterprise from across England and provided 
£9.54 million in grant funding (£6.89 million across 255 preliminary grants and £2.65 million across 64 
investment plan grants). At the time of writing, the total social investment achieved (26 deals to date 
valued at £17.48 million) has been nearly double the grant funding provided: a total we expect to grow 
further.
As important as the investment, though, is the learning that this work provides. That learning comes 
particularly from the different perspectives that all those involved - from providers to panels, from 
funders to partners – and we hope this evaluation communicates more of that learning from all of these 
different standpoints.
At Social Investment Business, we continue to incorporate insights from this programme into our 
existing work seeking to build greater resilience and effectiveness in charities and social enterprises; 
and we hope that sharing this evaluation widely can help others do the same. It is a programme we 
remain hugely proud of playing a part in – in helping organisations use the tool of finance to improve 
people’s lives.
42. Overview
Big Potential Breakthrough (BPB), was launched 
by the Big Lottery Fund in February 2014 
with funds provided by the National Lottery. 
The programmes aim was to improve the 
sustainability, capacity and scale of ‘Voluntary, 
Community and Social enterprise’ (VCSE) 
organisations in order to enable them to deliver 
greater social impact in their communities and 
beyond. Big Potential supported organisations 
looking to grow through securing repayable 
investment, as well as to buy in specialist 
support from a range of expert ‘providers’ 
to improve their investment readiness. The 
programme closed to applications in September 
2017 with final budget commitments being made 
in December 2017.
The programme had a £10 million fund that 
offered ‘voluntary, community and social 
enterprises’ (VCSEs) the opportunity to access 
grant funding of between £20,000 and £75,000. 
This was to undertake more in-depth investment 
readiness work with approved providers to help 
them develop their investment readiness and 
maybe go on to seek social investment in the 
future. The BPB sat alongside the Big Potential 
Advanced Programme (BPAP) that launched 
after BPB, and which also closed in December 
2017. BPB sought to support social ventures 
aiming to raise at least £500,000 investment, or 
who want to bid for contracts over £1 million. We 
were looking to achieve the following outcomes 
from the BPB programme:
• Supporting VCSE organisations to develop 
their capabilities to deliver social and 
charitable impact at greater scale for 
communities across England
• Improving learning and awareness of 
investment readiness approaches for VCSE 
organisations
The BPB programme was delivered by the Social 
Investment Business (SIB), in partnership with 
Charity Bank, Locality and Social Enterprise UK 
(SEUK). The University of Northampton is the 
evaluation partner for the fund’s research needs 
and the evaluation programme will continue 
until May 2020. The Big Potential Breakthrough 
Programme had seven distinct phases: 
• online registration
• online diagnostic tool
• 1:1 support advisor sessions
• selecting a support provider
• submitting the grant application 
• BPB panel assesses the application
• and post-grant work with the support 
provider (if successful)
In the online registration phase the VCSE 
registered for the programme. The VCSE then 
moved on to complete the online diagnostic 
tool (DT) in which they provided detailed 
information about their organisation’s business 
model (i.e. sector of operation, organisational 
reach, legal structure, financial data, income 
streams, governance models, staffing levels, 
skillsets, product details, accounting practices, 
and investment needs). Following this, the 1:1 
support advisor session involved the VCSE 
speaking face-to-face (usually through a video 
call) with an expert advisor to re-engage with 
the diagnostic tool and discuss their business 
5model. The VCSE then followed this by selecting 
a support provider from the list of approved 
providers who worked with them in partnership 
to develop their grant application. The grant 
application was submitted following a period 
of work with the provider and the BPB panel 
decided if the application was successful or not. 
If unsuccessful the VCSE was able to reapply 
to the BPB if it desired. If successful, the VCSE 
was awarded the grant funding and used this 
to begin to work with its support provider 
to develop its investment readiness and to 
possibly go on to secure social investment (for 
preliminary grants; investment plan grants had 
a much clearer investment journey/proposition). 
It is important to note that this process is 
considered to be developmental for the VCSEs 
and (aside from eligibility checks) the process 
is not selective until the panel decided to make 
a recommendation on the grant applications to 
the Big Lottery Fund. These seven phases are 
outlined below in Figure 2.1.
BPB was also supported by 17 events/
workshops in the English regions delivered 
during 2014-2017 with the objective of raising 
awareness on social investment and investment 
readiness and to promote how the BPB would 
be able to support VCSEs on their journey 
towards investment readiness. In addition 
to the main regional event programme, SIB 
and partners delivered bespoke events to 
organisations requesting such support wherever 
these could be accommodated within existing 
resources.
Figure 2.1 – Seven Phases of the BPB
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6This paper represents the fourth annual 
evaluation report for the BPB covering the first 
48 months of operation, up to February 23rd 
2018. In doing so it covers the entire grant award 
period of the programme (with grant awards 
completed by December 2017). However, as the 
monitoring of VCSEs continues until 18 months’ 
post-grant, the primary data collection phase for 
the research will not end until mid-2019 (or 18 
months after the final disbursement of funding 
is made). This report provides an overview of 
the efficacy of the BPB, the types of VCSEs that 
are applying to it and the impact that it is having 
on the investment readiness (and knowledge 
of investment) of these VCSEs. In providing 
this overview the report draws upon data 
gathered from within the programme including: 
website data; application data (the Diagnostic 
Tool); event/workshop evaluation data; and an 
investment readiness knowledge questionnaire. 
In addition, interviews were also held with VCSE 
applicants. What is becoming apparent as the 
research progresses is that the impact lead-
time for BPB is longer than expected, as VCSEs 
at the smaller end of the sector are perhaps 
further from being IR than was previously 
acknowledged. Therefore, the true impact of 
BPB may not be fully identifiable until well 
beyond the end of the programme. This research 
will seek to explore this impact on all VCSEs that 
have engaged with BPB as the evaluation draws 
to a close in 2020.
73. Executive Summary
All the data contained in this research reflects 
the performance of the BPB up to February 
23rd 2018. A mixed-methods approach to 
data collection was adopted that involved the 
collection of quantitative and qualitative data. 
The quantitative data (collected from 1,125 
VCSEs1) was collected through the online 
application process and the diagnostic tool 
(both online and one-to-one). These tools 
captured organisational data (i.e. sector of 
operation, organisational reach, legal structure, 
financial data, income streams, governance 
models, staffing levels, skillsets, product details, 
accounting practices, and investment needs). 
The qualitative data collected (from 23 VCSEs; 9 
Provider Organisations; 6 Panel Members; and 5 
investors) was in the form of 43 semi-structured 
interviews. For the VCSE participants:
• five had completed their grant applications 
• three were in the post-grant delivery phase 
• six had been unsuccessful
• three had been rejected but successfully 
reapplied to the programme 
• five were twelve months’ post-grant, and,
• one had withdrawn from BPB without 
making a grant application2. 
As in Years Two and Three, in Year Four no 
VCSEs had entered into dispute with the 
programme3. Therefore, a total of 45 interviews 
have been held with stakeholders by the end of 
Year Four of the BPB.
1 This figure includes eligible and ineligible VCSEs (994 eligible; 93 
ineligibles; 5 withdrawn; and 33 under review).
2 Three interviewees had participated from the withdrawn VCSE.
3 See Appendix A for a full methodological overview.
3.1 Research Findings
The research results gathered from the first four 
years of operation of BPB provide an interesting 
overview of both the performance of BPB and 
the wider VCSE sector. Specifically, to date:
• 16,811 sessions have been held on the 
website in the year (as opposed to Year 2’s 
49,983 and Year 3’s 45,997). This brings the 
total sessions to date to 135,528 sessions. 
This Year 4 drop is due to the BPB closing to 
applications just over halfway through Year 4 
of BPB4.
• 893 VCSEs have been directly engaged 
through the regional events. These regional 
events (one-day workshops) have had a 
significant impact on VCSE knowledge of 
social investment, with participants scoring 
+10.2% on a social investment knowledge 
test that was administered at the beginning 
and end of the workshops.
• Of the 1,125 VCSEs that completed the 
online DT, 994 VCSEs were classed as 
eligible for BPB. 
• 890 VCSEs completed their ‘1:1 Support 
Advisor Session’. 
• 702 VCSEs submitted grant applications, of 
which: 
 - Preliminary Grants:
 - 255 were successful.
 - 272 were rejected.
 - Investment Plan Grants:
 - 64 were successful.
4 BPB Year 4 commenced on February 23rd 2018.
8 - 111 were rejected.
 - Average grant value was:
 - £27,110 per organisation for 
Preliminary Grants.
 - £41,092 per organisation for 
Investment Plan Grants.
 -  £9.54 million of grant awards have been 
made
 - Total BPB grant spend of £9.45m5.
• Across the 4 years of BPB engagement 
issues have been noted including:
 - VCSEs in the South East, South West 
and East of England regions are under-
represented6. 
 - The engagement of women-led VCSEs 
is slightly below the national average of 
43%, at 31.5% across all four years.
• The VCSEs that engaged with the BPB were:
 - Small in scale (average turnover of 
£275,000).
 - Local organisations (70.4% operate at 
community, local and regional levels).
 - Very limited in profitability (average 
£334), but with good asset bases 
(£92,000) and debt levels (£15,000) 
(relative to turnover).
• Provider selection for VCSEs remains critical 
to the success of the BPB, especially around 
personal/organisational values, and Provider 
experience/skillsets.
• The Panel and grant decision-making phase 
worked well, although there was some 
frustration at what was seen as moving 
goalposts in relation to Panel decision-
5 £9.54 million in grants were approved, but ultimately £90,000 was 
returned to the BPB.
6 This data is based upon comparisons with data on the national 
proportions of VCSEs regionally contained in the 2017 NCVO Almanac, 
which utilises data gathered in 2015.
making, and inconsistencies as to how 
this was fed back to Providers and VCSEs 
independently.
• To date, 20 VCSEs have gone on to secure 
social investment totalling £17.48 million 
across 26 separate investment deals, out of 
a current grant awardee pool of 319 VCSEs 
and total committed grant funding of £9.45 
million. These finance deals were either 
community share investment or debt finance 
(loan) deals.
 - It could be argued that the investment 
statistics should only be compared 
against the 64 Investment Plan Grants 
awarded, as the Preliminary Grants 
were never explicitly aimed at raising 
immediate investment. On this basis, 
26 investment deals from 64 IP Grants 
(40.6%) indicates a much better return.
93.2 Recommendations & Learning
For the first three years of the BPB, 
recommendations for the development of the 
Programme moving forwards were made based 
on the research findings to date. However, as 
the BPB closed to grant applications on 15th 
September 2017, there is no remedial action to 
be undertaken in relation to the programme. The 
mechanisms of the fund seem to have operated 
well, with positive feedback being received 
from VCSEs, Providers and Investors/Panel 
members. The recommendations presented in 
this section are therefore aimed at understanding 
the long-term impact of the BPB (including 
monitoring investment outcomes) and more 
generally focused on similar IR programmes 
moving forwards. This can therefore be seen as 
a ‘Learnings’ section as recommendations for 
changes to BPB are no longer relevant.
Based on the conclusions outlined above, the 
following five key learning points are made for 
the BPB and other IR-focused programmes (as 
well as government and policy-makers) moving 
forwards. Some of these replicate what was 
identified in the Year 3 report, but have been 
updated slightly to also reflect nuances in the 
data from Year 4:
1. Engaging the Sector: Ensuring that 
programmes such as BPB reach different 
parts of the VCSE sector (geography; type; 
size) remains critical. Throughout the BPB, 
different geographic regions, most notably 
the South East and East of England have 
presented engagement challenges, as well 
as others periodically (the North East in 
Year 1 and the South West in Years 3 and 
4)7. Whilst programmes such as BPB can 
seek to overcome these through the use 
of innovative marketing techniques and 
7 It does not take into account areas of multiple deprivations nationally or 
within specific regions and so BIG may wish to tailor their response to 
this finding in relation to this.
events such as the regional workshops, 
wider ecosystem factors such as networks 
and critical masses of VCSEs in a given 
area are much more powerful shapers of 
engagement. Future programmes should 
consider how they can facilitate networks 
growth and connections, especially in 
regions that remain challenging across a 
variety of funding programmes (the East of 
England being a prime example).
2. The Journey: The design of the BPB VCSE 
journey has been one of the Programme’s 
biggest successes, as it has taken formative 
evaluations that allow VCSEs to learn 
throughout their applications as well as their 
post-grant work. This should be a model that 
is therefore adopted in future similar support 
programmes, as the ability to critically reflect 
on their sustainability and potential growth 
needs, without feeling that it might damage 
their application to BPB, was one that the 
VCSEs found empowering.
3. Provider Working: Provider/VCSE 
engagement and well-matched partnerships 
are key to the success of any IR or 
sustainability journey. BPB has been 
very successful in this area, but greater 
transparency of Provider performance, and 
mechanisms to avoid Providers ‘cherry-
picking’ good VCSE application candidates 
should be considered (although this last 
point is not necessarily always a bad thing in 
programmes such as BPB, as such cherry-
picking can lead to better grant applications 
and VCSEs more suited to the support aims 
of the programme). 
4. Sustainability Focus: Sustainability for 
VCSEs is the main aim, certainly for VCSEs 
that engaged with BPB. The fact that only 
8% of all VCSEs went on to secure social 
investment highlights both the issues of IR/
sustainability in the VCSE sector, as well 
as the lack of fit of many social investment 
10
products for VCSEs (although it should be 
noted that the investment figure for VCSEs 
receiving Investment Plan grants was 
31.3%8). In addition, scaling is not always 
the right model for increasing sustainability, 
particularly if this reduces the community 
focus and embeddedness of VCSEs. 
Therefore, programmes that recognise this 
and don’t have such an explicit message 
around social investment would be welcome 
in supporting the VCSE sector over what 
will be a very challenging next decade. For 
BPB this could be seen more as an issue 
of language rather than strategic aims, as 
whilst BPB was never intended to move all 
VCSEs down the path of receiving social 
investment, the language around ‘investment 
readiness’ in the programme meant that this 
was how it was perceived by many of the 
VCSE applicants. 
5. Direct Engagement Works: The research 
has shown that 893 VCSEs were engaged 
through BPB workshops or associated 
events throughout the life of the BPB, during 
which they learnt about social investment, 
the Big Potential Programme, as well as 
hearing from social entrepreneurs who have 
successfully secured funding from both the 
Big Potential and/or other social investors. 
There is a close correlation between these 
figures and the total number of eligible 
applications received (n=994)9, suggesting 
that engagement through the workshops 
was positively correlated with VCSEs then 
progressing to apply to BPB.
The BPB operated robustly and delivered 
genuine impact across the VCSE sector. The 
BPB engaged a wide variety of VCSEs from 
8 This is based upon 20 VCSEs receiving investment from 64 IP grants. If 
the number of deals (n=26) is used instead, then the success rate for 
IP grants rises to 40.6%.
9 Indeed, 890 VCSEs progressed to completing their 1:1 Support Advisor 
Session.
across England and provided £9.54 million 
in grant funding (£6.89 million across 255 
preliminary grants and £2.65 million across 
64 investment plan grants)10. The growth in 
social investment deals leveraged (26 deals to 
date valued at £17.48 million) means that the 
deals secured nearly double the grant funding 
provided (or a 6.6x return if only IP grants are 
considered). Given the long sustainability paths 
that BPB VCSEs are on, this deal flow will likely 
further increase in the future, as the nascent 
support provided through BPB leads to a rump 
of more sustainable (and hence IR) VCSEs 
emerging that require investment to scale, 
and show that what today looks like moderate 
success is in fact a significant impact on IR in 
the VCSE sector.
10 Albeit as was noted earlier, £90,000 of this was eventually returned to 
the fund giving a total grat spend of £9.45m.
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4. Results
The data gathered to date in the form of website 
statistics, diagnostic tool completions, workshop 
knowledge outcomes and the participant 
interview data are presented in this section. 
The results are presented in relation to each 
stage of the programme, with the statistical 
data used to demonstrate trends from the BPB, 
whilst the interview data is used to explore 
participant perceptions of the BPB to date, 
as well as providing context and explanation 
(where applicable) to the quantitative data. All 
the quantitative data presented in this section 
relates to the BPB performance up to February 
23rd 2018, whilst the qualitative data relates 
to VCSEs that either had received their grant 
application decisions or were already 12 months’ 
post-grant award before this date. As the last 
grant awards were made in December 2017, the 
data presented here represents the final cohort 
of VCSE applicants. However, tracking of these 
runs up until up to 18 months’ post-grant and so 
data collection remains ongoing until mid-2019.
4.1 Marketing, Online Registration  
and Events
The website demand statistics demonstrate 
the levels of online engagement with the 
BPB. The website captures a number of key 
indicators including website usage (per visitor 
page view); email statistics; and geographic 
reach. In addition, this section also reports the 
statistics for the BPB events held and all of 
these individual elements will be presented and 
discussed in turn. Table 4.1 below represents the 
website usage data for the period February 24th 
2017 to February 23rd 2018.
Table 4.1 – Website Usage Data
Webpage Page views Total Sessions
Big Potential 21,944 16,811
Sub-page Page Views
Learn 6,168
Prepare 653
Apply 5,122
Directory 3,142
Guide 2,625
In total there were 16,811 user sessions on the BPB website in Year 4 (compared with 49,983 in Year 
2 and 45,997 in Year 3) with the majority of visitors seeking to learn more about the BPB or to apply to 
the programme. This lower number is unsurprising given that the application window closed halfway 
through the year and knowledge and awareness of the programme would have been at its highest point 
at the end of the BPB.
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Table 4.2 below provides information on both the regional programme events provided around the 
country and the bespoke events at which a Big Potential presence was also involved. This details 
that 893 VCSEs have been engaged through the events (no events were held in Year 4 and so this 
represents the final total for the BPB and the same figures as the Year 3 report), during which they learnt 
about social investment, the Big Potential Programme, as well as hearing from social entrepreneurs who 
have successfully secured funding from both the Big Potential and/or other social investors. This also 
demonstrates that the workshop attendance and DT submission numbers are very similar, suggesting 
that engagement through the workshops was positively correlated with VCSEs then progressing to 
apply to BPB.
Table 4.2 –Events
Regional Programme Events
Location Year Bookings Attendees
Walsall 1 115 85
Plymouth 1 70 50
London 1 96 60
Leeds 1 95 89
Cambridge 2 65 38
Ipswich 2 65 42
Salford 2 60 51
Gateshead 2 61 24
Swindon 2 41 21
Darlington 2 75 43
Lincoln 2 26 12
Chelmsford 2 60 45
Sheffield 3 61 31
Coventry 3 54 25
Preston 3 61 45
Kent 3 67 51
Bespoke Events
Location Year Bookings Attendees
Nuneaton (Homeless Link 
Annual Conference)
1 15 15
Derby (YMCA Network) 1 30 23
Northampton 2 100 40
Good Deals 2 N/A 18
Hastings 2 N/A 85
Total 1,217 893
Nb. Re the bespoke events, SIB had responded to requests from networks of organisations who wanted to know more about social investment and hence 
delivered events/workshops for these organisations.
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Workshop attendees were also asked to complete a social investment knowledge questionnaire at both 
the beginning (Time 1) and end (Time 2) of the day, so that an understanding could be gleaned as to 
the impact that the workshop had on their knowledge of the Social Investment Market (SIM). This data 
is presented below in Figure 4.1 and identifies that the workshops had a positive impact on attendees’ 
knowledge of social investment. The overall impact to the end of the BPB programme (+10.2%) 
demonstrates that the workshops raised social investment knowledge as measured by the survey to 
around 86%. In addition, when asked to rate the workshops’ impact themselves the attendees scored 
the workshops effectiveness at 89.4% in improving their knowledge (Nb. 50% would have signalled no 
impact11). This demonstrates that the BPB workshops delivered strong impact on participant investment 
readiness knowledge and achieved good approval ratings from attendees.
Figure 4.1 – Workshop Social Investment Knowledge Test
Nb. See Appendix B for the full data breakdown.
11 The participants rated the impact of workshop on a 5-point Likert scale where the median value (3) represented no impact. Therefore, a score below 50% 
(3) would represent negative impact and a score above this would represent positive impact.
86.6%
78.5%
85.9%
86.1%
74%68% 76%70% 78%72% 80% 82% 86% 90%84% 88%
Year 3
Year 2
  Time 2   Time 1
Year 1
75.6%
76.6%
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Regional engagement was assessed using the 
data gathered in the Online Diagnostic Tool. 
Figure 4.2 below outlines the breakdown of BPB 
applicants by region.
Figure 4.2 – BPB Eligible DT Applicants 
by Region
Figure 4.2 above demonstrates that just under 
one-quarter of the eligible BPB online DT 
applicants were based in London (23.5%). The 
other main geographic regions engaging with the 
BPB were: North West (15.8%); Yorkshire and 
Humber (11.9%); and the North East (11.9%). 
In comparison with the average regional 
percentage of voluntary sector organisations 
as a proportion of the national total (see the 
2018 NCVO data below in Table 4.3)12, the 
representation from the regions on BPB was 
relatively in-line with regional averages. In 
London, the number of registered users was 
12 As noted in the Executive Summary, this is taken from the 2018 NCVO 
Almanac, which still utilises the 2015/2016 data.
higher (23.5%) than the average of 18%, as 
was the case in the North East with 11.9% 
of registered users compared to a national 
proportion of 3.4%. The notable exceptions 
were the South East (7.6% / 18.6%); the East 
of England (4.3% / 12.5%); and the South West 
(9.5% / 13.1%), which were significantly lower 
than their respective national averages (NCVO, 
2018). This data suggests that the BPB has 
struggled to engage with VCSEs from these 
three regions (South East, South West and 
the East of England) over the course of the 
programme13. 
It should be noted that these regions (and 
particularly the East of England and the South 
West) have traditionally been difficult areas to 
garner applications from on previous third sector 
programmes, and indeed there are limits to 
what programmes such as BPB can do to drive 
engagement. Examples such as the North East 
(a region that has significantly grown the VCSE 
ecosystem in recent years as previous BPB 
reports have shown), demonstrate that wider 
ecosystem factors are very powerful in driving 
engagement. As a social investor identified when 
discussing the difficulties in engaging certain 
regions:
   
So where there’s more of a cold 
spot for social investment, not just 
in the east of England but in other areas as 
well, like in Cumbria or, sort of more rural 
areas, it’s often harder, I think, to get social 
enterprise networks and clustering and 
to get, therefore, social investment.  And 
it’s more - the higher transaction costs to 
deliver social investment in those regions 
as well. (P39 – Social Investor)
13 As per the comment made in the Executive Summary, this data does 
not take into account regional differences in relation to areas of 
multiple deprivations. This means that caution needs to be applied 
before necessarily seeking to increase engagement with areas that 
whilst under-represented amongst registered users, may have less 
development needs than other regions.
London
South East
South West
East of England
East Midlands 
West Midlands
Yorkshire & The Humber
North East
North West
7.6%
9.5%
4.3%
23.5%
8.5% 6.9%
15.8%
11.9%
11.9%
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Nevertheless, future funding programmes similar to BPB need to be aware of these systemic and 
structural issues in engaging these regions on grant funding programmes. 
Table 4.3 – VCSE Regional Engagement at DT Stage
Region Total for Years 1-4 Difference to NA National Average
London 23.5% +1.8 % 18.0%
South East 7.6% -11% 18.6%
South West 9.5% -3.6% 13.1%
East of England 4.3% -8.2% 12.5%
East Midlands 6.9% -1.2% 8.1%
West Midlands 8.5% -0.1% 8.6%
Yorkshire & Humber 11.9% +4.2% 7.7%
North East 11.9% +8.5% 3.4%
North West 15.8% +5.8% 10.0%
Nb. National average data taken from NCVO (2018). Those regions highlighted in red are more than 25% down on the national average figures.
This section has provided an overview of the 
BPB website engagement data and shown a 
high number of individual user sessions over the 
course of the BPB (135,528 in total). It has also 
shown that the BPB has been broadly successful 
in reaching the VCSE sector across the whole 
of England, albeit there remain problems with 
engagement (that have persisted throughout the 
programme) in engaging the South East, South 
West and East of England. However, it can be 
argued that this is more an issue of regional 
infrastructure than it is BPB engagement. The 
North East acts as an interesting case-study 
here, with applications from the region to BPB 
soaring since Year 1. There is no doubt that the 
efforts expended by SIB through the regional 
workshops and promotion of the BPB helped 
here, but the growth in the VCSE sector in the 
North East, along with the support infrastructure/
ecosystem around it, has also contributed.  
Ongoing infrastructure building in the East of 
England (are almost certainly behind the historic 
low programme engagement rate of the region 
in BPB and similar programmes. The growth of 
Bristol as a regional hub for social enterprise 
(and indeed Plymouth also), may act to bolster 
the South West in the same way that Newcastle 
has for the North East, which may make 
engagement in these regions easier for future 
programmes.
4.2 The Online Diagnostic Tool
In total 1,02514 diagnostic tools were completed 
and submitted by eligible applicant VCSEs 
(from the 1,125 DT submissions in total). This 
represents an eligibility percentage of 91.1%. 
From the 1,025 eligible DTs received, 890 VCSE 
progressed to and had their 1:1 Support Advisor 
Session. Throughout the programme, VCSEs 
have been largely positive about the DT and 
1:1 Support Advisor Sessions, seeing them as 
developmental stages that allow them to test the 
assumptions they have about their investment 
readiness and to have these challenged/
supported by one of the advisors. As has been 
noted in previous reports, this provided the 
applicants with the ability to ‘critically reflect’ 
on the sustainability and IR. Some found the 
online experience a little ‘clunky’, although it was 
also argued that the experience was generally 
positive and in-line with other grant funding 
programmes.
14 This includes 994 eligible VCSEs and 31 who are under review.
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One [benefit] was it [the DT and 
1:1 Support Advisor Session] 
made us think more broadly about the 
organisation. Now, for me at the point I was 
at in my relationship with the organisation, 
I didn’t know a lot of this information, so 
it was challenging for me to be able to 
complete the application. So, in essence I 
completed the application with the Business 
Development Director because I didn’t know 
any of the answers. But the nature of who 
I am, and the nature of my role meant that 
all the answers were quite interesting and 
it helped as part of my induction basically 
to understand the broader leadership of 
governance, of the organisation. 
(P44 - Unsuccessful VCSE)
 
I found that really difficult actually, I 
have to say the online process could 
do with being improved significantly, it just 
wasn’t as intuitive as it needed to be, but 
there were also good things about it. The 
good things were that you could save your 
work and go back to it. The bad thing about 
it is you couldn’t…upload a table into the 
online [form]  
(P42 – Unsuccessful VCSE)
 
No, it’s laborious when it’s online…
if you leave it and forget because 
someone’s grabbed you off somewhere it 
times out on you and you lose things15. It 
drove me nuts, absolutely drove me nuts.  
But after the first time I learned my lesson.  
But other than that, it was okay, it was okay.  
It’s fairly typical and perhaps happens on 
most online forms doesn’t it.  
(P41 – Successful VCSE)
15Demographic data relating to the VCSE 
applicants was also captured by the DT which 
allows for the evaluation to build a picture of 
the types of VCSEs that applied to BPB. By the 
end of Year 4 data had been collected through 
the DT from 1,025 VCSEs that were deemed 
eligible for BPB16/17. In relation to these VCSE 
organisational profiles the diagnostic tool 
revealed the following key organisational traits 
for the average VCSE applicant to BPB (see 
Figure 4.3):
Figure 4.3 – VCSE Organisational 
Demographics
Nb. See Appendix C for the full data breakdown. All averages presented 
here are median values.
15 It should be noted that the BPB website did not have the functionality 
to time people out, this was not a feature in the design. Therefore, this 
issue probably relates to the individual’s own PC or internet connection 
timing out.
16 This means that the sample is skewed towards BPB eligibility and so is 
not wholly representative of the VCSE sector.
17 The overall research has access to a larger set of demographic data 
(n=1,475) and DT data (n=1,125), which will be utilised in academic 
reports/papers, but that are not relevant to this report here. There is 
also a commitment to make this dataset open access at the end of the 
BPB programme (subject to anonymization of the data).
3 FULL TIME STAFF
4 PART TIME STAFF
10 VOLUNTEERS
AGE 9 YEARS
TURNOVER £275,000
PROFITS £334
DEBT £15,000
ASSETS £92,000
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In comparison to the data gathered in the first 
three years, the demographic data across the 
four years of the BPB is almost identical with 
few changes. Indeed, the smaller-end of the 
VCSE sector that engaged with BPB consisted 
of mainly micro-enterprises (less than 10 FT 
staff), with turnover of £250,000 per year and 
extremely low profitability (0.1% of turnover). 
These VCSEs were also significantly reliant on 
just two main income streams and derived half of 
their income from the public sector. Conversely, 
despite this the organisations are characterised 
by low debt-levels and decent asset bases, with 
an asset/debt ratio of over 6:1. The investment 
needs of VCSE applicants remains the same 
as reported in the first three years, with an 
average investment need of £250,000 (91% 
of annual turnover). The increasing size of the 
sample to date provides more confidence to the 
assertions made in the previous three reports 
that this segment of the VCSE sector has 
serious sustainability issues, and that support 
for the sector is still urgently needed if a serious 
retrenchment of the third sector is not to be 
experienced in the next decade.
The reasons for exploring/seeking investment 
articulated by the VCSEs in Year 4 were the 
same as those discussed by the VCSEs during 
the previous three years (social/commercial 
scaling; consolidation of previous growth; 
and organisational independence/flexibility; 
property/assets acquisition/renovation; income 
diversification). As with the previous reports, 
growth was viewed as part of a broader journey 
towards becoming more sustainable and 
increasing the resilience of the VCSE. However, 
VCSEs were naturally nervous about pushing 
on with scaling the organisation, as they wanted 
to also ensure that they could mitigate the risks 
involved. BPB was seen as an essential part of 
this mitigation as it provided external resources 
to test and approve expansion plans.
 
The diversification of income, I 
think, remains quite a significant 
priority……and that is happening at 
multiple levels, so there are new projects 
that we are looking at.  
(P44 – Unsuccessful VCSE) 
 
Going from an organisation like 
ourselves, we have a turnover 
of about £1.5 million, and the contract in 
question at the time was worth around 
£700,000, and going from that to a contract 
that was worth £1.5 million and that would 
nearly double our turnover, was something 
that we felt we shouldn’t do without 
support. Because as you know sometime if 
organisations run too fast then sometimes 
they fall over.  
(P42 – Unsuccessful VCSE)
 
As a business we like to ensure 
that we mitigate the risk, because 
if you do it wrong you are putting people 
out on the street. So we have grown quite 
spectacularly over the last few years and we 
have won awards for the work that we have 
done, but you have still got to ensure that 
the risks for the [beneficiaries] is kept low. 
So the approach to taking debt on is that we 
will probably follow the same trajectory as 
our knowledge and confidence.  
(P34 – Successful VCSE)
Sustainability has been a key feature of the 
data gathered within this research, as the 
support delivered by BPB is viewed by many 
of the VCSEs, and also critically Providers and 
Investors as being wider than just investment 
readiness. Indeed, capacity building, resilience 
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and sustainability were all key issues discussed 
by the participants in relation to BPB, with the 
notion that this can often be achieved without 
scaling also being discussed as an issue.
Yes, it’s fantastic as a capacity 
programme because it was open, 
it was flexible.  There was a broad general 
thing that said all the support being 
proposed should help, and how has does 
the support being proposed help them win 
over an investor subsequently, which is 
great. But actually, winning over an investor 
is not the same as what you need to 
be sustainable. (P38 – Provider)
Ultimately we did what the 
programme [BPB] asked us to, but 
what we were really doing was we were 
helping them to become sustainable and I 
think quite a lot of the time we were giving 
them much broader advice, we weren’t just 
focusing on how we could get them 
social investment. (P40 – Provider)
I don’t think that social investment 
is all about scale and I think that 
the focus on scale is a distraction and it 
drives this - it’s often driven by a finance-
first mentality.  If you come in as an equity 
investor or a VC fund background you think 
you have to build scale and exist and get a 
return. And so it drives your whole way of 
analysing an investment opportunity…  
so achieving scale to do that is in some 
cases counter intuitive because you can 
sacrifice social impact when you 
scale. (P39 – Social Investor)
The majority (52.2%) of VCSE applicants were 
Companies Limited by Guarantee (see Figure 
4.4 below), with over one-third (37.2%) of 
applicants being social purpose organisations 
such as charities, social enterprises and 
cooperatives (Community Interest Companies, 
Industrial Provident Societies and Charitable 
Incorporated Organisations). In addition, 55.9% 
of all organisations were also registered charities 
showing that the majority of the organisations 
(irrespective of legal form) were the trading 
arms of charities. Whilst BPB experienced a 
downward trend in the number of registered 
charities applying in Years 2 and 3, there was an 
upturn in charitable applications in Year 4 back 
towards Year 1 levels [62% (Year 1); 49% (Year 
2); 52% (Year 3); and 61.8% (Year 4)].
Figure 4.4 – Organisational Legal Form
Nb. See Appendix D for the full data breakdown.
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In relation to geographic reach, 70.4% of all 
VCSE applicants operated at a localised level 
(neighbourhood, local authority and regional 
combined) (see Figure 4.5). A total of 17.3% 
of VCSEs operated at a national level. This 
compares with a sector trends of 78% of VCSEs 
operating locally and 22% of VCSEs operating 
nationally (NCVO, 2017).
Figure 4.5 – VCSE Geographic Reach
Nb. See Appendix E for the full data breakdown.
In relation to engagement with VCSEs that are 
women-, BME-, and disabled-led, engagement 
was mixed (see Figure 4.6 below). Women-led 
organisations represented just under one-third 
of the sample (31.5% across all four years of 
BPB) compared with annual breakdowns of: Year 
1 = 34%; Year 2 = 30.6%; Year 3 = 27.8%; and 
Year 4 = 34.9%. As has been noted in previous 
reports, this is lower than the sector average of 
50% provided by Teasdale et al. (2011) and 43% 
by NCVO (Lewis, 2010). However, despite four 
interviews (two in Year 4 to explore this further) 
with randomly selected women-led VCSEs no 
cause for this has been identified. Indeed, for the 
women-led VCSEs interviewed in Years 2, 3 and 
4 the interviewees did not articulate any barriers 
to engagement based on gender.
BME-led VCSEs accounted for 14.2% of the 
sample across all four years (Year 1 = 12%; 
Year 2 = 18.8%; Year 3 = 14.1%; and Year 4 = 
12.7%) compared with a national rate of 7.7% of 
VCSEs that were primarily BME focused (NCVO, 
2014a). As has been noted in previous reports, 
BME engagement has not been a problem area 
for BPB, as BME VCSEs have applied to the 
programme consistently in higher numbers than 
the sector national average.
There was a sharp spike in the number of VCSEs 
identifying as disabled-led in Year 4 (n=10), 
with 10 new applicants compared to the 6 that 
had applied across the first three years. As has 
been previously noted in prior BPB reports, 
this engagement rate of 1.7% of all applicants 
being disabled-led18 could be significantly 
higher than a national average that could be as 
low as 1/800 (Hazenberg, 2017). This relates 
back to the discrepancy between organisations 
being disabled-led and disabled-focused 
that was identified in previous BPB reports. 
This also demonstrates though that BPB has 
engaged much more strongly with disabled-led 
organisations in Year 419. Despite the research 
approaching 5 of these 16 disabled-led VCSEs 
to date to engage in the research through 
telephone interviews, none have agreed to 
participate. However, given the above this does 
not seem to be a major issue for BPB as a 
programme.
18 The definition used here is that at least 51% of disabled people on the 
board.
19 Indeed, SIB focused a significant amount of work in Year 4 to reach out 
to disabled-led VCSEs based upon the findings of previous research 
reports. This has clearly had a significant impact on engagement.
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Figure 4.6 - Women-, BME- & disabled-led VCSEs
Nb. See Appendix F for the full data breakdown. The data here represents the proportions for Years 1, 2, 3 and 4 combined. As was outlined above, it is difficult 
to ascertain the true size of the disabled-led VCSE populations nationally and so the figure shown here is 0%. All national average data is taken from the 2015 
NCVO Almanac, as the 2018 Almanac does not contain updates to this data.
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Finally, VCSE organisations were also asked to rate their perceptions of their social mission, social 
impact measurement, the validity and reliability of this measurement and how they reported it (see 
Figure 4.7a). The VCSE applicants were asked to rate their social impact measurement on an 11-point 
Likert scale in relation to the following four areas (for full details on the scale end-points and the full 
questions asked please see Appendix G):
Figure 4.7a – Social Impact Measurement Perceptions
Nb. See Appendix G (Table 7.6a) for the full data breakdown. The Likert ratings are represented here as percentages.
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Vision: Does your organisation have a clear vision for 
change and the impact you are trying to achieve?
Management: What methods does your organisation 
use to manage performance and/or measure impact?
Fairness: What do you do to ensure that the 
information you capture and report about your 
performance and social impact is fair?
Report: How do you report on your achievements  
and impact?
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The overall data here is very similar here to 
that reported in Years 1, 2 and 3; namely that 
VCSEs can articulate their vision for change and 
how they deliver social impact, but that they 
struggle more to measure this accurately and 
disseminate it appropriately. Again, as with the 
interview data from the first three years, social 
impact measurement as a key issue emerged 
again in the Year 4 interviews, both as a form of 
market analysis and as a means to evaluate and 
understand products/services delivered  
by VCSEs:
Particular areas that we needed 
particular support with were market 
analysis and understanding more our social 
impact, as well as creating a social impact 
framework for the new service.  
(P43 – Successful VCSE)
The research is exploring the impact of BPB 
on the social impact of VCSE grant awardees, 
utilising SIB’s Method for Impact Analysis and 
Assessment (MIAA) tool20. SIB conducts the 
MIAA with VCSEs at two stages: The first MIAA 
is conducted when a grant has been awarded to 
a VCSE; whilst the second MIAA is conducted 
when the post-grant work is completed and 
the monitoring of the grant with the VCSE is 
closed. The MIAA has a maximum score out of 
30 and the tool is being used to understand how 
engagement with the BPB shapes VCSE social 
impact over time. The data for the longitudinal 
impact to date (some VCSEs are still not 18 
months’ post grant award) is displayed below in 
Figure 4.7b.
20 It should be noted that the MIAA solely seeks to explore VCSE 
perceptions of their social impact. It does not in any way actually 
measure social impact. The exploration of perceived social impact 
is gained in relation to three areas: mission fulfilment; beneficiary 
perspective; and wider impacts.
Figure 4.7b – Social Impact 
Measurement Perceptions
Nb. See Appendix G (Table 7.6b) for the full data breakdown. The MIAA 
scores out of 30 are represented here as percentages.
The data reveals that organisations are 
experiencing a statistically significant (p < .001) 
increase (+7.2%) in their MIAA scores during the 
post-grant phase of the BPB. This demonstrates 
that during this time VCSEs are increasing their 
impact according to the measures within the 
methodology. Whilst this data cannot solely be 
attributed to BPB, given the focus of many of the 
grants in part on social impact measurement (70 
of the grants awarded had a social impact/social 
impact measurement element to the post-grant 
support), and the qualitative interview data that 
suggests the funded work around SIM is having 
a positive effect, it would seem that the BPB is 
having a significant effect on grant awardees 
ability to engage in social impact measurement. 
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Indeed, as some VCSE participants stated, the 
impact of BPB on social impact (and other areas) 
was significant:
Yes, we did target specific areas.  
It was around social impact.  It 
was around the governance structures.  
Financial, obviously.  We need to prove that 
we’ve got the correct financial modelling 
in place to be able to substantiate the 
expansion plan as we see it.  And around 
marketing and the growth of that particular 
element of the business. So the delivery of 
the Big Potential work that we’re doing at 
the moment is hugely around sustainability, 
hugely around financial modelling, you 
know, social impact, all of those 
things. (P41 – Successful VCSE)
By the end of Year 4, the data reveals that BPB 
applicants were in the vast majority: micro-
enterprises (less than 10 employees); with limited 
turnover (£270,000); limited staff resources (3 
FT staff); relatively high reliance on volunteers; 
extremely small profit margins (0.1%); a high 
reliance on a small number of contracts (<2); 
and on public sector income (50% of total 
income). The VCSEs also struggle to measure 
and report the social impact that they deliver, 
and so are limited in their ability to market the 
good work that they do. BPB is clearly having a 
positive impact on this ability to measure social 
impact within organisations. Nevertheless, from 
a sustainability and/or IR perspective, BPB 
VCSEs (i.e. the smaller end of the VCSE sector) 
clearly face significant sustainability challenges 
and there is substantial work to be done to 
raise the sustainability of this segment of the 
sector. This suggests that the support delivered 
by programmes similar to BPB, is (and will be) 
crucial to the health of micro-VCSEs moving 
forwards.
4.3 The 1:1 Support Advisor Sessions & 
Assessing Investment Readiness
In Year 4, 258 1:1 Support Advisor Sessions 
(SASs) were held/booked with VCSEs, in 
addition to the 176 held in Year 1, the 225 held 
in Year 2, and the 231 held in Year 3 (890 in total, 
out of 994 1:1 invitations). This demonstrates 
how the applications and 1:1s increased over 
the final year of the programme, as the partners 
engaged in more 1:1 SAS in the 7 operational 
months of Year 4, than they did in the whole of 
Year 3 (and indeed 179 in one quarter alone!). 
Across the full four years of the programme, 
93 VCSEs had been assessed as ineligible, 5 
VCSEs had withdrawn and 33 VCSEs still have 
their status as under review (1,125 submitted 
DTs across the four years). Figure 4.8 below 
provides an overview of the 1:1 Support Advisor 
Session provision for each quarter of the BPB 
from 24th February 2017 to 23rd February 2018.
Figure 4.8 – 1:1 Support Advisor 
Sessions by Quarter
Nb. Provision of 1:1 SAS ended in September 2017, hence the lack of data 
for Y4 Q4.
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Total 1:1 Support Advisor 
Sessions Held - 258
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Figure 4.8 identifies that the BPB held 37 1:1 
Support Advisor Sessions per month in Year 4 
(a significant increase over the average of 16 
sessions per month in Year 1, 21 sessions per 
month in Year 2 and 20 sessions per month 
in Year 3). This is due to the fact that VCSEs 
realised that BPB was due to close to grant 
applications, and so inevitably led to a spike in 
applications and hence 1:1 SASs. Across the 
four years of the programme (41 operational 
months) BPB averaged just under 22 1:1 SAS 
per month. As was found in the previous reports, 
VCSEs valued the ability to test their DT audit of 
themselves with an external ‘expert’.
Having got through the first part, 
which was really quite interesting, 
and having got the feedback from our 
external consultant [1:1 Support Advisor] 
and the areas that she identified and raised 
made a lot of sense to us…….I think the 
adviser report that we got back from Big 
Potential helped to refine some of the areas 
that we as an organisation were aware of, 
but maybe hadn’t recognised how much we 
needed to improve at basically.  
(P44 – Unsuccessful VCSE)
The 1:1 Support Advisor Session also provided 
the opportunity to reassess (with the expert 
advisor’s help) the VCSE’s overall investment 
readiness score on the diagnostic tool (for more 
information on how investment readiness was 
assessed please see Appendix H). Figure 4.9 
below outlines the scores of VCSEs in relation to 
their investment readiness when first engaging 
with BPB for Years 1, 2, 3, 4 and overall.
Figure 4.9 – Investment Readiness 
Scores (Online DT)
Nb. See Appendix H for the full data breakdown. A score of 80% or higher 
on the diagnostic tool is viewed as being ‘investment ready’.21 
The data shows that during Year 4 applicant 
VCSEs scored higher in their overall DT 
investment readiness score than at any other 
time during the BPB programme. This shows 
that BPB was receiving applications in Year 4 
from VCSEs that were (marginally) closer to IR 
than those that applied in Years 1 and 3, and 
significantly more IR than those that applied in 
Year 2. Nevertheless, this finding also continues 
the trend noted in previous reports across all 
four years of the BPB, that applicant VCSEs 
were well below the 80% threshold score 
deemed to indicate IR22. This demonstrates the 
significant and continuing IR and sustainability 
21 The 80% threshold and the IR scores in general were never used by 
SIB in the assessment of grant applications, it was merely a feature of 
the research data collection design. The threshold of 80% is a feature 
of the tool as designed by Locality.
22 It should be noted that the use of this threshold figure is purely for 
research purposes and was not used by SIB in their management of 
the project or to assess applications. Indeed, the overall IR score for 
applicant VCSEs was irrelevant in the BPB itself.
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(ONLINE DIAGNOSTIC TOOL)
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issues that face the micro-enterprise segment 
of the VCSE sector that BPB seeks to support. 
Indeed, this acknowledgement of the lack of IR 
and sustainability in the micro-VCSE sector has 
been a feature of the BPB research throughout 
the data gathering and analysis phases.
When analysing the demographic data in relation 
to initial IR scores, there was also a statistically 
significant difference in VCSE IR scores both 
in relation to whether a VCSE was a registered 
charity and whether it was BME-led. Indeed, 
those organisations that were also registered 
charities scored on average +5.5% higher than 
those VCSEs that were not registered charities, 
whilst those VCSEs that were BME-led scored 
3.6% lower than non-BME-led VCSEs (see 
Appendix H for an overview of this data). These 
findings suggest that there is more of a demand 
for IR support in the non-charitable and BME-led 
segments of the VCSE sector23. 
The interviewees in Year 4 identified how 
programmes like BPB provide VCSEs with 
the time to ‘unpick’ their business models 
and assumptions. Previous reports have 
also noted the ‘journey’ nature of investment 
readiness support, and the importance of 
‘critical reflection’, and this remains a key theme 
emerging from the data. Indeed, as one Provider 
eloquently explained:
So programmes like Big Potential 
are great at giving individual 
enterprises time and space to properly 
unpick this and work out how does it best 
apply to them. And the best way to do that is 
to hold themselves against it. How have we 
designed and deliver programmes 
at the moment? (P38 – Provider)
23 There is a caveat here that the data only relates to those VCSEs that 
applied to BPB and so were actively seeking IR, this could skew the 
data when compared to the sector as a whole.
The 1:1 Support Advisor Sessions continue 
to act as initial means for VCSEs to ‘critically 
reflect’ on their IR (and sustainability). It provides 
a lens with which to identify weakness and 
development needs, and to do so with the aid 
of an external critical friend. It is apparent from 
the data gathered across the four years that the 
VCSEs that are applying to BPB have general IR/
sustainability problems.
4.4 Preparing the Grant Application
The pairing of the VCSE with a BPB support 
provider organisation marks the point at 
which the provider partnering element of the 
programme truly begins. During this phase 
the VCSE works with the provider to identify 
areas of organisational need, devise strategies 
for meeting these needs and also prepare 
and submit the final grant application to the 
BPB. During this phase no quantitative data is 
collected; however, this phase and the impact 
that it had on the VCSEs was explored in the 
interviews and the following themes were 
identified in relation to this phase of the BPB.
The grant application phase remains a critical 
element in the BPB journey, and one that in the 
main seemed to work well, both in relation to the 
mechanics of building the application, and also 
in relation to the Provider selection and 
relationship in co-producing applications. 
Indeed, as has been seen in BPA, there was a 
tendency for organisations to select Providers 
that they knew or had worked with previously, 
and there was acknowledgement of how useful 
the Provider database on the BPB website was 
in demonstrating the various skillsets of different 
organisations. The co-production of applications 
was also critical, as it allowed the VCSEs and 
the Providers to ensure that they were on the 
same page regarding what was to be delivered 
and why.
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It wasn’t a hard application. The 
monitoring element of it is fine for 
us as an organisation.  As you said earlier, 
it’s our bread and butter so it’s us, 
what we do. (P41 – Successful VCSE)
It [application] was actually really 
straightforward and quite supportive 
actually……the practicalities to apply were 
mostly straightforward…   
(P43 – Successful VCSE)
To be honest, and I will be brutally 
honest - we filled out the application 
and we chose our provider.  And the guy 
who we ended up choosing is a guy who I’ve 
known for many years, a guy called [Name], 
who actually used to work for me many, 
many moons ago. So I rated him, because 
you know you choose people who you think 
are going to be good for you and good for 
the organisation.  And [Name] used to work 
for me as a business adviser in a past job I 
had.  And I thought he was very good at the 
time so that’s why we chose that provider, 
in all honesty. Because I just thought he 
delivered very well for me at the time, he’s 
got a good reputation around.  I’d seen his 
name, I thought, ‘You’ll do for me!’ That’s 
quite simply how we chose the 
provider. (P41 – Successful VCSE)
I was aware of [Provider Name] 
anyway, but we did have a shortlist 
of two who were local to us…but there was 
a really helpful directory on the BP website 
as part of the application process that gave 
you a lot of detail about where the strengths 
of these different providers were…  
(P43 – Successful VCSE)
I probably did about 70-75%, so he 
[Provider} did about 25% of it.  He 
helped us with - because he’s really good at 
financial stuff so - and the milestones, so he 
took my brain and broke it down into simple 
milestones, because I just talk and talk and 
talk and talk.  
(P41 – Successful VCSE)
Whilst previous reports have highlighted the 
importance of ‘gut feeling’ and personal value 
alignment between Providers and VCSEs, as 
well as ‘knowledge fit’, data from the Year 4 
interviews (and interviews from Years 1-3) 
demonstrates that Providers having a broad 
skillset is also beneficial to VCSEs. Indeed, the 
ability to utilise multiple consultants with different 
skillsets is appreciated by the VCSEs, even if this 
does tend to favour the larger Providers (or 
individual consultants working together). 
However, this does not necessarily represent a 
problem for BPB, as Providers building critical 
masses of different expertise, either within their 
organisations or as a network of smaller 
consultants, is part of the market development 
mission that BP has had across both 
programmes. Whilst this developmental arc 
could create potential problems in relation to the 
growth of large ‘prime-like’ providers who then 
use smaller organisations/consultants to sub-
contract delivery (as has been seen elsewhere in 
public service delivery), this could be viewed as 
part of the process of building a nascent 
marketplace. 
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Then we have a team of lots of 
different consultants, well probably 
about 10 different consultants, that all 
do different specialisms, so like we had 
specialists in social impact, outcomes 
monitoring, specialists in the social finance 
side. We had specialists in marketing, 
assessing different markets, business 
planning, so you know we brought in these 
real specialists so that they were getting a 
real package from us. 
(P40 – Provider)
There remains however, an element to BPB in 
its design that Providers were  keen to identify 
those VCSEs that they believe are most likely to 
be able to develop sustainability/IR and secure a 
grant to do so. This ‘cherry-picking’ of VCSEs is 
perhaps inevitable and by no means necessarily 
a bad thing, as it means that only the most 
suitable VCSEs end up preparing and submitting 
grant applications. Indeed, as one Provider 
noted:
If I am being quite critical, we really 
selected the ones that were most 
likely to achieve sustainability in some way 
or raise investment or whatever  
you know. (P40 – Provider)
The data presented in this section has shown 
that the grant application phase, with its Provider 
selection and coproduction emphasis worked 
well on BPB. It allowed VCSEs to build upon the 
critical reflections that they undertook during 
the DT and 1:1 SAS stages, and provides a 
continuation in the IR journey being undertaken. 
Indeed, as Case-study F shows later in the 
report, this part of the journey can lead to 
positive social investment outcomes and the 
securing of investment, even when a grant 
application is ultimately not submitted.
4.5 The Panel & Grant Decision Phase
In relation to the Panel phase and the final 
decision as to whether to accept or reject grant 
applications, the research evaluation has access 
to both quantitative and qualitative data. In 
total there were 702 grant applications across 
all four years (66 in Year 1; 188 in Year 2; 189 
in Year 3; and 259 in Year 4); of which 319 
were successful, and 383 were unsuccessful/
withdrawn24. In relation to the types of grants 
that have been awarded, to date the BPB has 
provided £9.54 million in grant funding25 (£6.91 
million across 255 preliminary grants at an 
average of £26,852 per grant; and £2.63 million 
across 64 investment plan grants at an average 
of £41,092 per grant). The majority of preliminary 
grants (56%) have been used by VCSEs to 
measure social impact, with the remainder split 
between changing governance structures (18%) 
and developing new income streams (26%)26. 
For Investment Plan Grants the split was 
across changing governance structures (33%), 
developing new income streams (24%), and 
measuring social impact (43%)27.
Figure 4.10 below outlines the main trends 
emerging from this data in relation to grant 
awards as a whole (Preliminary Grants and 
Investment Plan Grants). The IR score of a VCSE 
at the online 1:1 DT stage was not predictive 
of grant outcome, with no significant difference 
between the IR scores of unsuccessful and 
successful applicants for either Preliminary 
Grants or Investment Plan Grants. As has been 
noted in previous reports, the DT scores when 
first applying are not meant to discriminate, 
but rather as a means to identify weaknesses 
24 27 of these applications were originally unsuccessful and accepted 
after resubmission.
25 £90,000 across 7 grant awards was returned to the BPB ultimately 
meaning as total spend of £9.45m.
26 Based upon available data from a sample of 171 Preliminary Grant 
Awards.
27 Based upon available data from a sample of 46 Investment Plan Grant 
Awards.
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in the VCSE’s business model that needs to be 
addressed. Indeed, given that the aim of the 
BPB was to raise IR in those that most needed 
it, it is intuitive that there would not be a link 
between these two variables. Figures 4.11a 
and 4.11b (also below) outline the specific and 
thematic reasons for grant application rejection.
Figure 4.10 – Grant Awards Offered
See Appendix I for the full data breakdown including Preliminary and IP 
Grants analysed separately.
Figure 4.11a – Grant Application Detailed 
Rejection Reasons
Nb. See Appendix J for the full data breakdown.
Figure 4.11b – Thematic Rejection Reasons
Nb. See Appendix J for the full data breakdown.
TOTAL GRANT AWARD VALUE = £9.54M
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Figure 4.11a reveals that the largest rejection 
reasons given for grant applications being 
unsuccessful across the first four years were 
poor description/understanding of market 
position; unclear social impact; and poor basis 
for costs in the proposal. These accounted for 
29.8% of all rejection reasons, despite only 
being 3/18 of the possible rejection reasons. 
In addition, across the thematic areas a poor 
investment readiness plan, a poor budget and a 
lack of track record accounted for 77.5% of all 
rejection reasons. It should also be noted that 
due to the surge in applications during Year 4 
because of the imminent closure of BPB to new 
applications, rejections towards the end of BPB 
were shaped by the Panel being constrained by 
a high volume of applicants and a very limited 
remaining budget for grant awards.
In relation to the Panel process, whilst in the 
main throughout the 4 years of the evaluation 
this has been viewed positively, by Panel 
members, VCSEs and Providers, there were 
nevertheless frustrations in relation to what was 
perceived as moving goalposts in Panel criteria, 
and a mismatch between what was being 
informally cascaded from SIB to the Providers 
and what appeared on the website guidance. 
This often undermined trust between Providers 
and VCSEs.
…it seemed that for about a six, 
eight-month period, every month the 
panel retrospectively changed their criteria.  
So we as providers then lost credibility with 
clients which made it hard for us to work 
with them in the future again, or word gets 
around. And that change of criteria wasn’t 
necessarily that - it didn’t get passed back 
up publicly.  So it came to us as providers 
but then as far as the guidance went, that 
was publicly available to groups looking at 
it. ‘Well the guidance says we don’t need 
to worry about that’. ‘Well actually, we do’. 
‘What do you know?  We are going with 
what the funder’s telling publicly’. Might just 
see it with Power to Change at the moment.  
Power to Change as a communication is 
shocking in that they actually contradicted. 
There’s a programme that I represented a 
client to on the panel recently and they said, 
‘Oh yes, but these parts of the budget aren’t 
eligible because they’re capital’. We said, 
‘But the guidance your panel, you the panel 
published four weeks ago, publicly to all the 
Programme partners says it is’. ‘Oh well, 
it’s not now’. What the [expletive]. But that’s 
the nature of the game.  For all the good 
stuff that comes out there’s messy stuff 
but that’s the nature of - you know. My idea 
is that actually I reconcile that because of 
one of Newton’s Laws of Thermodynamics 
- every action has an equal and opposite 
reaction.  We live in a universe of a finite, 
fixed amount of energy so there’s some 
good stuff that we get out of this and 
some flexibility, there’s some openness, 
there’s some responsiveness, that’s some 
understanding from SIB, there’s got to be 
some crap that comes with it to 
balance it out. (P38 – Provider)
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4.6 Post-Grant Phase
As was noted above, 319 grant awards were 
made throughout the BPB. As of February 23rd 
2018 of these 319 grants awards (64 of which 
were IP grants) made, 20 VCSEs have secured 
social investment across 26 separate investment 
deals. Figure 4.12 below provides an overview of 
this secured investment.
Figure 4.12 – Investment Secured to Date
Nb. This data is based on the 26 investment deals currently secured by 20 
BPB grant awardees.
To date nearly £17.5m has been raised in social 
investment through a mix of debt finance (loans) 
and equity finance in the form of community 
shares, at an average investment amount of 
just over £672,000 per deal. Whilst it could be 
argued that 26 from 319 grant awards is low 
(8.2% investment success rate – a modest 
increase of 0.5% from Year 3), it should be 
recognised (and has been in previous reports), 
that the serious sustainability issues facing 
VCSEs, particularly those at the micro-enterprise 
end of the spectrum, precludes many of these 
from accessing investment. Indeed, the industry 
average for private sector SMEs accessing 
investment is not any higher as one participant 
points out below. Furthermore, VCSEs also face 
barriers to investment when they have reluctant 
Trustees or staff who do not see the value of 
investment or scaling and worry about the risks 
attached to it.
If you look at the mainstream SME 
marketplace, only about 8% of SMEs 
borrow money, so we need to see Charities 
and social enterprises borrowing money 
in that context. It isn’t for everybody and 
only a small percentage of them should 
be borrowing. I think there is a natural 
reticence from Trustees…they are natural 
risk-takers in their day-to-day lives, but 
they become a trustee and they walk 
through a vortex that they can’t take any 
risk whatsoever. 
(P45 – Panel Member)
Certainly in terms of the Executive 
[Team] and Head Office the people 
here are quite clued up and are looking 
strategically for ‘okay what are the next 
steps?’ [in relation to investment and 
scaling]. Whereas often people who are out 
on the ground in their local provision and in 
their local services they are focused on the 
[beneficiaries] as that is who they see day-
in-day-out…  
(P44 – Unsuccessful VCSE)
It could be argued that the investment statistics 
should only be compared against the 64 
Investment Plan Grants, as the Preliminary 
Grants were never explicitly aimed at raising 
immediate investment. On this basis, 26 
investment details from 64 IP Grants (40.6%) 
indicates a much better return. 
In the first three years of the BPB, the evaluation 
identified five long-term impacts of engaging 
with BPB for VCSEs, namely: governance and 
leadership; market analysis; strategic planning; 
TOTAL INVESTMENT RAISED = £17,482,735
DEBT FINANCE 
£16,900,000
EQUITY FINANCE 
£582,735
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legitimisation of the VCSE’s future plans; and 
social impact measurement. In Year 4, the 
interviewees discussed the process of managing 
these journeys, and how the flexibility offered 
(by and large) within BPB and the programme 
management from SIB was extremely positive. 
In addition, the journeys were not just impactful 
for the VCSEs, but also for the Providers, who 
argued that their knowledge and capacity had 
grown by being part of the BPB. This shows that 
the programme is also having the desired effect 
of improving the sustainability of the entire social 
investment ecosystem.
It has been a very positive 
experience being contract managed 
by Big Potential28, we found our relationship 
manager very flexible, responsive and yeah, 
really it’s been great.  
(P43 – Successful VCSE)
Now in the context of it being a 
nine-month award window29, okay 
it makes sense, but it wasn’t quite flexible 
enough. Our three-way conversation 
between SIB, the provider and the client 
and then a couple of short weekly e-mail 
updates for a month should have covered 
that really. So as a result, we had to go back 
and request an extension of another quarter 
because the client didn’t have the budget 
to do all the work properly to get back on 
track. But again, SIB were very open to 
doing that.  You know, ‘We need an extra 
quarter’. ‘Yes fine, okay’, and they’re up for 
that.  And off it went.  
(P38 – Provider)
28 This is the participant really referring to SIB, as BP is not an 
organisation that can manage a VCSE relationship.
29 It should be noted that this is a Provider referring to the grants that 
they worked on. The award window was at the VCSE/Provider’s 
discretion and could be as long as 18 months.
Personally, my knowledge around 
the social investment market was 
virtually zero at the beginning……so I 
think it has been good for all of us really, I 
think it has generally been a good learning 
curve. Because it is quite a new area for the 
voluntary sector, loan finance. 
(P40 – Provider)
There was however, some critique from the 
participants of the social investment ecosystem 
more broadly, critiques that chime in with 
previous report findings centred on the issues of 
sustainability more broadly, and the desire and fit 
of social investment for VCSEs in general. One 
social investor provided an interesting critique of 
both sides of the social investment marketplace. 
The assertion that VCSE business models are 
too stretched to make investment viable also 
resonated with a VCSE as well, which argued 
that they did not have the capacity or profitability 
to scale.
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But from the demand side the 
critique was that none of this money, 
or not enough of this money is actually 
trickling down into the sector.  So the bulk 
of the smaller to medium sized charities 
and social enterprises are not getting 
access to social finance, there’s not enough 
of that blended finance, or unsecured 
finance or patient capital or equity available. 
Obviously, equity is more challenging, 
but even the unsecured lending wasn’t 
happening. And from the supply side, the 
critique is that their business models are 
very stretched and it’s very difficult for them 
to be sustainable.  And that they therefore 
need this continued subsidy of we want to 
build the market and if we want them to 
serve that segment, the bulk of the market, 
which is the smaller to medium sized 
organisations.  
(P39 – Social Investor)
We are in what I can only imagine 
is a completely typical situation 
[for VCSEs] which is where we make a, our 
margins of course are tight because we 
are a charity we aren’t in it for the profit 
necessarily, however, we cannot afford  
to expand.  
(P42 – Unsuccessful VCSE)
Some participants also argued that the VCSE 
sector was facing significant challenges 
over the coming decade, as funding streams 
changed, and more pressure was put on VCSE 
sustainability and resilience. They also argued 
that this was to a degree a problem with the 
social investment market itself, with a lack 
of product innovation and affordability being 
identified as something that social investors and 
SIFIs needed to rectify.
I think we will see that over the 
next 5-10 years, as some charities 
will simply go out of business, and the way 
that they will deal with that is that they will 
merge with someone else who aligns with 
many of their core values.  
(P44 – Unsuccessful VCSE)
So I don’t think that there isn’t 
a pipeline of investment ready 
organisations out there, I think it’s the 
finance that isn’t fit for purpose.  And that’s 
certainly the line that [Foundation Name] 
would take as well, in that they tried to shift 
by, for example the [Fund Name] and by 
ceding new blended finance funds out there 
with the degree of subsidy, of grant subsidy 
there so that those loans can be made on 
more of an unsecured basis so that they 
could have a grant element to them.  The 
higher loss rate, or the higher transaction 
costs can be subsidised by that grant 
element that’s in the Fund.  
(P39 – Social Investor)
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What then also came out again, with 
the research, chimed with what 
I’ve seen and experience in chatting about 
informally with other people, which was 
social enterprises, whether they be rural 
or urban, if they are going to take on some 
kind of debt then by far their preferred 
first choice is their regular High Street 
Bank because it’s quick, it’s easy, there’s 
an existing relationship, off they go. Then it 
becomes friends and family, whether that 
be corporate friends, so partner charities 
or others as well. And then a distant third 
are social investors.  And the reasons that 
are cited - and again it goes for multiple 
research papers as well, so I’m quite 
confident in it, which is it’s the cost of it; 
it’s financially too expensive in terms of the 
interest rates, the arrangement fees.  It’s 
too expensive in the time it takes to arrange 
the application in the first place and it’s too 
expensive in the terms of the time it take so 
to manage it and report back  
against it. (P38 – Provider)
This product immaturity in the marketplace was 
also identified as a political problem, as social 
investment and investment readiness have been 
pushed by successive governments as a means 
to scale the VCSE sector and make it more 
sustainable (as has been argued in previous 
reports IR and sustainability are effectively the 
same thing). The future threats to the VCSE 
sector was also seen to a degree as a result 
of the retrenchment of the state and reduced 
funding streams over the last decade, with a 
social investor arguing that ultimately VCSEs 
were left exposed with the ‘tide pulling back’.
I also think that there is a huge 
political push for social investment 
which we’ve seen from Big Potential 
Programme being formed; which we’ve 
seen in the formation of Big Society Capital, 
who are still struggling to get their money 
out; which we see in the formation of the 
Access Foundation who are still trying to 
figure out how you turn this key of 
getting it all going. (P38 – Provider)
I think it’s very difficult because I 
almost see it like a visually, a like 
a wave, like a mass, a large wave that’s 
pulling, like the tide is pulling back and then 
you see, it exposes everyone on the beach, 
you see how fragile the business models 
are.  So when it’s receding it just exposes 
all of the financial fragilities, it exposes the 
risk, it exposes the over-dependency on 
specific contracts etc.   And in the meantime 
there isn’t anything else.  Like, there isn’t a 
wave behind it coming in to fill that in.  And 
so you have a real - I do think a number of 
organisations are being pushed to the wall.  
I think that’s true about the intermediary 
level of the advisors and I think it’s also 
true with the actual delivery organisations 
on the ground.  And I keep coming back 
to who pays, who’s’ going to pay for this?  
Especially if you’re providing services for 
very vulnerable, under privileged, low 
income people with multiple  
complex challenges.  
(P39 – Social Investor)
However, BPB cannot be viewed as a standalone 
programme, independent of all the factors 
outlined above. Indeed, the wider ecosystem has 
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been identified in previous reports as having a 
considerable impact on making investment deals 
happen.  Ultimately, this isn’t (and shouldn’t be 
made) a blame game, as the social investment 
market itself is exposed to wider exogenous 
factors, and programmes such as BPB are 
then affected by external factors within the 
social investment ecosystem. This ecosystem 
is complex and filled with different actors all 
behaving in different ways, even if the end 
goal of growing social investment is the same. 
Viewed within this, the success of the BPB 
programme in leveraging out grant funding and 
supporting 26 social investment deals should not 
be underestimated, particularly at this end of the 
VCSE market (i.e. micro-enterprises).
I think the one thing I’ve learned is 
that the more you study this market 
the more complicated and complex it is.  
It’s sort of - reality is very complex and 
so I wouldn’t paint a dichotomous view of 
the sector.  It’s not ‘this or that’, or black 
and white.  And sometimes when you talk 
to people their length of analysis gets a 
bit fixed and that is sometimes aligned 
with their political perspective or political 
philosophy. But I actually think the market 
is much more complex than that and it’s 
dynamic and it’s constantly evolving.  And 
so I think there are no good actors or bad 
actors in this space; everyone is motivated 
by trying to find solutions, by trying to 
create social impact based on what their 
understanding of that is. And I think that’s 
a good thing and a healthy thing and I think 
there will be more actors coming into the 
market.  There will be more innovation and 
I think there will be more opportunities for 
partnering with the private sector as well, 
for example.  
(P39 – Social Investor)
Finally, one Provider also reflected on how 
positively they viewed a programme that 
evaluated itself annually, responded to critiques 
of the evaluation, and published this online for 
VCSEs and Providers to see.
I think it was a bold, grand 
experiment of support.  I think it 
was incredibly enthusiastic, which was good 
and bad.  I think the fact that it has every 
year done an open evaluation on itself is 
very commendable because for me, as a 
provider, that’s had an immediate reflect 
on how I think about the programme, how 
I support groups through it, rather than 
just, ‘Let’s have a chat with the programme 
manager every once in a while’.  
(P38 – Provider)
4.7 Big Potential Breakthrough  
Case-studies
This section seeks to explore the experiences of 
VCSE organisations that are 12 months’ post-
grant and aims to provide short case-study 
overviews of VCSE journeys through BPB in 
order to provide a narrative of the experience. 
The purpose of these case-studies is not to 
present a uniform map of the journey or to 
suggest standardised pathways that can occur 
through BPB, but rather to provide a rich picture 
of the possible journeys and outcomes that 
a VCSE can go through in preparing a grant 
application, working together in the post-grant 
phase, and in securing or exploring social 
investment30.
30 Please note, the case-studies in this section are labelled F-G, as A-E 
were in the Years 2 and 3 reports.
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VCSE-F operates in the citizenship and 
community sector (it also operates in the 
housing and mental health and wellbeing 
sectors) and is based in the Yorkshire 
and Humber region. It is an Industrial and 
Provident Society and when applying initially 
to BPB it had: 
• been in operation for 11 years; 
• employed 12 staff (6 FT and 6 PT); 
• had a turnover of just over £400,000 and 
was non-profit; 
• had an almost 1:1 asset/debt ratio; 
• received only 2% of its income from the 
public sector (with 75% of its income 
coming from just two contracts). 
VCSE-F provides an interesting case-
study for this report, as whilst it was 
unsuccessful in applying for a BPB grant, it 
has nevertheless since raised investment of 
nearly £500,000. 
VCSE-F applied to BPB as it wanted 
support to develop a community shares 
initiative (CSI), which it could use to grow 
the business by paying off an existing loan. 
This refinancing would allow VCSE-F to halve 
its interest rate and so be able to reinvest 
surplus into the organisation and pay a 2% 
dividend annually to its community lenders. 
However, having commenced its BPB journey 
(DT and 1:1 completed) and being paired 
with a Provider, VCSE-F made the decision 
to discontinue its BPB journey as it felt that 
the time required to complete a high-quality 
application would be too intensive and a 
distraction from its core focus on raising the 
CSI. As was stated at the time31:
…we needed to raise £400,000 through 
a CSI. [VCSE-F] has an existing loan 
with [social investor name] at 6% interest, and 
the new CSI will payback this loan and halve 
our interest rate, hence allowing us to then 
pay a 2% dividend to lenders.  
(VCSE-F – Vice-chair)
Having decided to not further pursue a 
BPB grant VCSE-F then began to build a 
comprehensive business plan (an experience 
that was found to be very intensive) and 
also familiarise themselves with the criteria 
for the Community Shares Standard Mark 
(more information can be found at https://
communityshares.org.uk/standard-mark-0). 
The business plan included 30-year financial 
forecasts for the dividends and structure of 
the CSI, and an open board meeting was 
held to allow members of the IPS to come 
and question the senior management and 
board members about the implications of the 
CSI. Crucially, VCSE-F was supported by a 
Provider organisation through this process, 
despite there not being grant funding from 
BPB to finance this. This evidences how BPB 
can have an impact on VCSEs pre-grant by 
facilitating networking with Providers. The 
case-study also shows how social investment 
journeys can look, when grant funding is not 
available to support the development work.
[Provider Name] has helped us with 
sustainability and questioning 
our assumptions. (VCSE-F – Chair)
31 Due to the location of the interview, it was not recorded, hence the 
quotes presented in this case-study are paraphrased based on 
the notes taken during the interview.
4.7.1 – Case-study Organisation F
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However, the CSI was not launched merely 
to refinance existing debt, as only half of 
the targeted fund-raising was allocated to 
repay the existing debt. The other half of 
the funding was earmarked for potential 
investments and to assist with cashflow 
(at least for the first 9 months as after this 
the money has to generate a return for the 
dividends). The investment opportunities for 
VCSE-F included buying property (including a 
community library) that could be used for the 
housing element of its operations and as a 
‘spill-over’ for its community work.
…offers flexibility around cashflow, 
should other opportunities arise, 
including housing to let……we are exploring 
investment in the old [building name] and 
community library. We can use this for housing 
and spill-over space for [VCSE-F] 
(Vice-chair - VCSE-F)
The role of partnerships and networks were 
also acknowledged by VCSE-F as being 
critical to getting the CSI off the ground, both 
in strengthening the CSI offer, but also in 
allowing VCSE-F to draw in outside expertise 
and learn from other VCSEs that had gone 
through similar experiences. This was not just 
in relation to providers and funding bodies 
(25% of the investment was drawn from the 
Community Shares Booster Programme), but 
also in the form of local/regional third sector 
networks and local social enterprise start-
ups. VCSE-F is also engaged with two local 
universities to support it to understand the 
social impact of its work and its community 
engagement model.
Partnerships and collaboration were 
key. We are a member of Coops UK and 
had the support of our Provider. We are also 
plugged into regional third sector networks 
and have supported other local social 
enterprise start-ups as well.  
(VCSE-F – Chair)
As was noted above, the CSI offer has 
now closed, and the near £500,000 raised 
by VCSE-F is over 20% higher than their 
original target (they have effectively reached 
their best-case scenario ‘top target’). The 
investment raised will allow VCSE-F to 
operate on a more solid commercial footing 
and hence enhance sustainability, whilst 
crucially delivering more social impact in 
the community. The fact that this has all 
been achieved without BPB grant funding 
provides an interesting model as to how 
it might be envisaged that the social 
investment ecosystem can work in the future. 
Nevertheless, the BPB, through the DT and 
1:1 SAS stages, along with the Provider 
selection, demonstrates that support can 
still assist organisations such as VCSE-F 
to access social investment. As one social 
investor noted when discussing the role that 
Community Shares can play in delivering 
social investment and VCSE scaling, through 
embedding organisations within their 
communities:
And I think there’s an argument about 
being embedded in a local place and 
about knowing the community.  And so I would 
include within the social investment spectrum 
things like community share offers and that 
that’s a really viable, vibrant market that 
should be continued to be developed because 
it helps to sustain organisations to diversify 
their income stream, to help them become 
more embedded and more impactful within 
the place that they’re operating.  
(P39 – Social Investor)
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VCSE-G is a charity that operates in the 
employment, education, wellbeing and 
community sectors (the organisation has 
a broad and holistic offer across multiple 
services) and is based in the North West 
region. The organisation works with children, 
young people and families; was 31 years old 
when applying to the BPB (32 years old now); 
has a turnover of just over £600,000 pounds 
per annum; and has over 19 staff (18 FT; 1 
PT)32 as well as 15 volunteers. VCSE-G is 
therefore relatively typical of the sector that 
BPB is targeting albeit still larger than the 
VCSE averages outlined earlier in this report.
We’re 32 years old as an organisation.  
And we deliver many things under our 
organisation. But it was established from a 
group of local women who wanted to do 
something for the community.  It was in the 
1980s and they wanted to invest in the 
community, create things for local people who 
were, at the time, we were back in austerity 
then, very similar to today, create facilities and 
services just for the local community. Today 
[VCSE-G] is a large organisation with 30 
members of staff who deliver many 
things. (VCSE-G – CEO)
VCSE-G does have considerable assets 
(mainly property) of nearly £2 million and zero 
debt, hence as an organisation this assists 
with its sustainability and ability to leverage 
in investment. However, it also uses these 
assets to support other VCSEs through 
32 This is data gathered from the BPB DT data. The Charities 
Commission data also shows the organisation as having 19 
employees, so the quote from the CEO below probably reflects 
discussions of the wider ‘workforce’ including volunteers.
partnerships and commercial relationships 
(i.e. renting space), which provides it with 
both commercial revenue, but critically also 
organisations that can assist it to provide 
genuinely holistic services to its beneficiary 
groups.
Yes, we own - we’re based in the last 
Georgian terraced block of buildings in 
north Liverpool, so the Rotunda stands loud 
and proud.  We own the whole block and it’s 
all knocked into one.  So it’s a lot like 
Hogwarts, there’s staircases and rooms 
everywhere.  But within our buildings 
as well, I think it’s really important to 
say, is we partner with like-minded 
organisations.  So when people want to move 
in and rent space…we rent… (VCSE-G – CEO)
VCSE-G decided to explore social investment 
and BPB as they needed to expand their 
premises, to deal with the higher number of 
referrals that they were experiencing. The 
new space was to be found by renovating 
existing (but unusable) space, across multiple 
levels of the property, and VCSE-G saw BPB 
as the way to explore and increase their 
investment readiness and raise the £200,000 
of social investment that they required.
…what we were seeing was our 
referrals were increasing significantly.  
And in terms of the space we have…we 
needed to try and expand that space because 
of the numbers of people who were coming to 
us who needed that additional support……
equally the current year we are in now, they 
were highly complex, multi-complex problems 
and issues.  Which we were saying, we can 
take them but we were running out of space. 
That’s ultimately where it came from. 
(VCSE-G – CEO)
4.7.2 – Case-study Organisation G
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When applying for the BPB grant VCSE-G’s 
focus on sustainability, through targeted 
work on social impact measurement, finance, 
governance and marketing work was built 
into the grant application. Having been 
successful and awarded a grant of just over 
£25,000, VCSE-G is now six months into the 
post-grant phase and the work is progressing 
strongly. Indeed, they remain confident that 
they will be able to secure the investment 
required to scale their impact.
Yes, we did target specific areas.  It was 
around social impact.  It was around the 
governance structures.  Financial, obviously.  
We need to prove that we’ve got the correct 
financial modelling in place to be able to 
substantiate the expansion plan as we see it.  
And around marketing and the growth of that 
particular element of the business. So the 
delivery of the Big Potential work that we’re 
doing at the moment is hugely around 
sustainability, hugely around financial 
modelling, you know, social impact, all of 
those things…… So we’re getting there.  Yes, 
so it’s moving along, we’re in the middle of a 
certain section, so we’re in the middle of the 
financial performance section of the 
quality impact section (VCSE-G – CEO)
For VCSE-G, the issue of sustainability and 
how BPB and investment can help them to 
achieve this is clear, as to the organisation 
the ability to enhance sustainability is 
intrinsically linked to the ability to scale 
impact. They argued that this has knock-
on effects for the sustainability of the local 
community and were clear that relatively 
small amounts of investment can lead to 
such impacts.
It’s all about sustainability.  It’s about 
impact and sustainability ultimately. 
The last year…it was in a loss-making 
position. This year we’re looking to break even 
because of the demand for it [services].  And if 
we can get this [inaudible] investment right 
then it’s going to see an increase in 
sustainability, it’s going to keep people in jobs, 
we’re going to see more young people with 
more outcomes, more positive outcomes and 
progression……It’s hopefully going to see 
more regeneration for the area as well…… 
So the wider impact is there for us as well.  
You know, £200,000-£250,000 type of 
investment doesn’t sound a lot but it’s 
huge in terms of what it can deliver in a 
place like this (VCSE-G – CEO)
Whilst positive about BPB and clear that 
social investment in the next six months 
was an achievable goal, the outcomes for 
VCSE-G still (understandably) remain unclear. 
Irrespective of whether social investment 
was achieved, VCSE-G was clear that BPB 
had achieved a positive impact for them 
in relation to sustainability and investment 
readiness. However, they were concerned 
that with the ending of programmes like BPB, 
whether this would damage their ability to 
network and engage with social investors. 
The research will follow-up this case-study in 
Year 5 to see whether social investment was 
accessed by the end of 2018 as planned.
I’ll be really interested to see what the 
outcome at the end of this piece of work 
is, working with the provider that we’ve 
chosen.  And I suppose for me it’s the after 
care.  Once this grant’s gone and then I need 
to link in with all of these social investors, you 
know, Big Potential, Big Society Capital, all of 
those, is where’s the networks for me to do 
that…to be out, meeting with these people 
[social investors] (VCSE-G – CEO)
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5.1 Overview of Performance
The BPB launched in February 2014 and closed 
to applications 3½ years later in September 
2017. The programme received: 
• 1,125 completed online DTs, of which 994 
were eligible for BPB. 
• In relation to the 964 eligible online DTs: 
 - 890 1:1 Support Advisor Sessions were 
held. 
 - 702 grant applications were submitted, 
of which: 
 - 319 were successful 
 - 383 were unsuccessful33
• BPB has provided £9.54 million34 in grant 
funding (£6.91 million across 255 preliminary 
grants at an average of £27,110 per grant; 
and £2.63 million across 64 investment plan 
grants at an average of £41,092 per grant).
The marketing of the BPB built upon the 
successes outlined in the Year 2 report, with 
135,528 total user sessions on the BPB 
website; and 893 VCSEs engaged directly 
through the workshops held around the country. 
This has led to a broad-based engagement 
with the VCSE sector, although problems of 
engagement still persist in relation to the South 
East (7.6% / 18.6%); the East of England (4.3% 
/ 12.5%); and the South West (9.5% / 13.1%) 
regions. The proportion of women-led VCSEs 
remained slightly below the national average 
33 21 of these applications were originally unsuccessful and accepted 
after resubmission.
34 £9.54 million in grants were approved, but ultimately £90,000 was 
returned to the BPB.
as stated by NCVO (31.5% of applicants / 
43% national average), although none of the 
women-led VCSEs interviewed identified any 
issues themselves with the BPB in this respect. 
Engagement with disabled-led VCSEs trebled 
in Year 4 to an overall proportion of 1.7% of all 
applicants, which is higher than the estimated 
1/800 national ratio of disabled-led VCSEs 
identified in the Year 3 report. As was noted 
earlier, this is testament to the engagement work 
carried out by SIB in Year 4 with the disabled-led 
sector.
The turnover, profitability and asset/debt ratios 
within the Year 4 cohort were almost identical 
when compared to Years 1, 2 and 3, which 
suggests that the BPB still managed to reach 
its target audience of small-scale, locally based 
organisations that struggle with profitability 
and sustainability. The average IR scores as 
calculated by the DT in Year 4 was 59.5%, and 
increase of 2.2% over Year 3, and more in line 
with the Year 1 data (Year 2 represented the 
lowest average at 49%). Nevertheless, the 56% 
average score across the four years was still 
low, and demonstrates that most VCSEs are a 
significant distance away from being IR. This 
demonstrates a clear need for support across 
the sector in regard to IR/sustainability focused 
programmes.
As in the first three years, the online DT, 1:1 
support advisor session, and grant application 
were all viewed positively and as constructive 
processes, and no major negative critique was 
received in the interviews. The grant application 
phase appeared to be working well, with 
VCSEs and Providers working together and co-
producing applications. The Provider selection 
5. Summary & Recommendations
40
process was also viewed positively, although 
some VCSEs selected Providers that they had 
existing relationships with, whilst some Providers 
did admit to ‘cherry picking’ VCSEs that they 
thought had the ability to succeed through an IR 
journey. 
VCSEs and Providers were broadly happy with 
Panel feedback, although some did bemoan 
what they saw as the moving goalposts of Panel 
decision-making. The main specific reasons 
for rejection across the four years of BPB were 
poor description/understanding of market 
position (9%); unclear social impact (9.6%); and 
poor basis for costs in the proposal (11.2%). 
Thematically, rejections were generally related to 
poor track record (23.1%), a poor IR plan (28%) 
and poor costing’s (26.4%).
The post-grant work and the development of and 
impact on VCSEs in the 18 months’ following 
the grant award was commended by the VCSEs, 
Providers and Investors as being very positive. 
This echoed the findings of the Years 1, 2 and 
3 reports and was especially true in relation to: 
governance and leadership; market analysis; 
strategic planning; legitimisation of the VCSE’s 
future plans; and social impact measurement. 
Indeed, in relation to the last area SIB’s MIAA 
tool (that assesses an organisation’s social 
impact), identified a +7.2% improvement for 
VCSEs that completed their post-grant phases. 
Wider sustainability and resilience remain critical 
factors however, as social investment is not for 
everyone (indeed Case-study F provides a good 
overview of how a VCSE identified an alternative, 
community-led means to raise investment, after 
being rejected for a BPB grant). 
To date, 26 social investment deals have been 
secured across 20 BPB VCSEs, with a total value 
of £17.48 million. This evaluation argues that this 
represents a successful intervention, given the 
micro-enterprise35 nature of BPB VCSEs, their 
lack of IR and the fact that only 64 IP grants 
have been awarded. Indeed, the data identified 
in this report around the wider sustainability 
impacts plus wider ecosystem factors (over and 
above IR that affect deal-flow) means that BPB 
needs to be judged differently to other similar 
initiatives that operated in different segments 
of the market (e.g. Investment and Contract 
Readiness Fund36 and BPA). The progressive 
journey that some VCSEs travel (e.g. Preliminary 
Grant/Investment Plan Grant/BPA) also means 
that the lead times for developing IR at this end 
of the VCSE sector are significant. Whilst this 
finding replicates what has been presented in 
the first three years of BPB evaluations, the data 
from Year 4 only serves to further underline these 
earlier findings. IR in the micro-enterprise end of 
the VCSE sector remains extremely challenging, 
and innovative social investment products 
that understand these challenges are urgently 
required.
5.2 Recommendations
For the first three years of the BPB, 
recommendations for the development of 
the Programme moving forwards have been 
made based upon the research findings to 
date. However, given that the BPB closed 
to grant application submissions on 15th 
September 2017, there is no remedial action 
to be undertaken in relation to the programme. 
The mechanisms of the fund too, seem to 
have operated well, with positive feedback 
being received from VCSEs, Providers and 
Investors/Panel members. Therefore, the 
recommendations presented in this section are 
aimed at understanding the long-term impact 
of the BPB (including monitoring investment 
outcomes) and more generally focused on 
35 Defined as less than 10 FTE employees.
36 The ICRF was a £13.2m fund that supported VCSEs to access 
investment and contract deals (Ronicle and Fox, 2015).
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similar IR programmes moving forwards. This 
can therefore be seen as a ‘Learnings’ section 
as recommendations for changes to BPB are no 
longer relevant.
Based on the conclusions outlined above, the 
following five key learning points are made for 
the BPB and other IR-focused programmes (as 
well as government and policy-makers) moving 
forwards. Some of these replicate what was 
identified in the Year 3 report, but have been 
updated slightly to also reflect nuances in the 
data from Year 4:
1. Engaging the Sector: Ensuring that 
programmes such as BPB reach different 
parts of the VCSE sector (geography; type; 
size) remains critical. Throughout the BPB, 
different geographic regions, most notably 
the South East and East of England have 
presented engagement challenges, as well 
as others periodically (the North East in 
Year 1 and the South West in Years 3 and 
4)37. Whilst programmes such as BPB can 
seek to overcome these through the use 
of innovative marketing techniques and 
events such as the regional workshops, 
wider ecosystem factors such as networks 
and critical masses of VCSEs in a given 
area are much more powerful shapers of 
engagement. Future programmes should 
consider how they can facilitate networks 
growth and connections, especially in 
regions that remain challenging across a 
variety of funding programmes (the East of 
England being a prime example).
37 It does not take into account areas of multiple deprivations nationally or 
within specific regions and so BIG may wish to tailor their response to 
this finding in relation to this.
2. The Journey: The design of the BPB VCSE 
journey has been one of the Programme’s 
biggest successes, as it has taken formative 
evaluations that allow VCSEs to learn 
throughout their applications as well as their 
post-grant work. This should be a model that 
is therefore adopted in future similar support 
programmes, as the ability to critically reflect 
on their sustainability and potential growth 
needs, without feeling that it might damage 
their application to BPB, was one that the 
VCSEs found empowering.
3. Provider Working: Provider/VCSE 
engagement and well-matched partnerships 
are key to the success of any IR or 
sustainability journey. BPB has been 
very successful in this area, but greater 
transparency of Provider performance, and 
mechanisms to avoid Providers ‘cherry-
picking’ good VCSE application candidates 
should be considered (although this last 
point is not necessarily always a bad thing in 
programmes such as BPB, as such cherry-
picking can lead to better grant applications 
and VCSEs more suited to the support aims 
of the programme). 
4. Sustainability Focus: Sustainability for 
VCSEs is the main aim, certainly for VCSEs 
that engaged with BPB. The fact that only 
8% of all VCSEs went on to secure social 
investment highlights both the issues of IR/
sustainability in the VCSE sector, as well 
as the lack of fit of many social investment 
products for VCSEs. In addition, scaling is 
not always the right model for increasing 
sustainability, particularly if this reduces 
the community focus and embeddedness 
of VCSEs. Therefore, programmes that 
recognise this and don’t have such an 
explicit message around social investment 
would be welcome in supporting the VCSE 
sector over what will be a very challenging 
next decade. 
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5. Direct Engagement Works: The research 
has shown that 893 VCSEs were engaged 
through BPB workshops or associated 
events throughout the life of the BPB, during 
which they learnt about social investment, 
the Big Potential Programme, as well as 
hearing from social entrepreneurs who have 
successfully secured funding from both the 
Big Potential and/or other social investors. 
There is a close correlation between these 
figures and the total number of eligible 
applications received (n=994)38, suggesting 
that engagement through the workshops 
was positively correlated with VCSEs then 
progressing to apply to BPB.
38 Indeed, 890 VCSEs progressed to completing their 1:1 Support Advisor 
Session.
The BPB operated robustly and delivered 
genuine impact across the VCSE sector. The 
BPB engaged a wide variety of VCSEs from 
across England and provided £9.54 million 
in grant funding (£6.89 million across 255 
preliminary grants and £2.65 million across 
64 investment plan grants)39. The growth in 
social investment deals leveraged (26 deals to 
date valued at £17.48 million) means that the 
deals secured nearly double the grant funding 
provided (or a 6.6x return if only IP grants are 
considered). Given the long sustainability paths 
that BPB VCSEs are on, this deal flow will likely 
further increase in the future, as the nascent 
support provided through BPB leads to a rump 
of more sustainable (and hence IR) VCSEs 
emerging that require investment to scale, 
and show that what today looks like moderate 
success is in fact a significant impact on IR in 
the VCSE sector.
39 Albeit as was noted earlier, £90,000 of this was eventually returned to 
the fund giving a total grat spend of £9.45m.
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ANOVA Analysis of Variance: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is a statistical test that is used to 
compare average scores (means) across two or more conditions (Field, 2009:348).
CIC-G Community Interest Company Limited by Guarantee
CIC-S Community Interest Company Limited by Share
CIO Charitable Incorporated Organisation
CLG Company Limited by Guarantee
ICRF Investment and Contract Readiness Fund
IPS Industrial Provident Society
IR Investment readiness: IR relates to ‘an investee being perceived to possess the 
attributes, which makes them an investible proposition by an appropriate investor for the 
finance they are seeking’ (Gregory et al., 2012:6).
SI Social investment: relates to the practice of providing finance to social ventures (debt, 
equity or mezzanine finance) with an expectation that a social as well as financial return 
will be generated (Brown and Norman, 2011).
SIB Social Investment Business
SIM Social investment market: The SIM is the marketplace in the UK within which social 
investment takes place. It is made up of a variety of individual and organisational 
investors including: angel investors; ‘social investment finance intermediaries’ (SIFIs); 
social banks; wholesale banks (e.g. Big Society Capital); government funds; social 
venture capital firms; and social philanthropy funds.
SROI Social Return on Investment: SROI is a social impact measurement methodology/
tool that assesses the social/environmental impact of an organisation by monetising 
outcomes and assessing them in relation to the resources invested.
VCSE Voluntary, Community and Social Enterprise.
6. Glossary of Terms
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7.1 – Appendix A: Methodology  
& Sample Data
Quantitative data was collected through the 
online application process and the diagnostic 
tool (both online and one-to-one). These tools 
captured organisational data (i.e. sector of 
operation, organisational reach, legal structure, 
financial data, income streams, governance 
models, staffing levels, skillsets, product details, 
accounting practices, and investment needs). 
Data relating to participant perceptions of their 
knowledge of the social investment market was 
also captured through questionnaires that were 
distributed at the workshop events. All data 
was analysed using the Statistics Package for 
the Social Sciences’ (SPSS), with descriptive 
statistics sought, alongside ANOVAs and paired-
sample t-tests. Quantitative data in the form of 
the DT was also captured from VCSEs that were 
12 months’ post grant award, so as to capture 
longitudinal changes following engagement with 
the BPB.
Qualitative data in the form of a semi-structured 
interview (see Appendices L-O for the interview 
schedules) was collected from 23 VCSEs ; 9 
Provider Organisations; 6 Panel Members; and 
5 investors. For the VCSE participants five had 
completed their grant applications; three were 
in the post-grant delivery phase; six had been 
unsuccessful, three had been rejected but 
successfully reapplied to the programme, five 
were twelve months’ post-grant and one had 
withdrawn from BPB without making a grant 
application . As in Years Two and Three, in Year 
Four no VCSEs had entered into dispute with the 
programme. Therefore, a total of 45 interviews 
have been held with stakeholders by the end of 
Year Four of the BPB. 
As of February 23rd 2018 the BPB had received 
and made decisions on grant applications from 
702 VCSEs, and the participant VCSEs in this 
research were selected randomly from these 702 
organisations (with the caveat that there would 
be a purposeful split across different stages of 
the programme (i.e. successful and unsuccessful 
VCSEs; VCSE 12 months’ post-grant). The 
interviews explored each VCSE’s business 
model, their experience of the BPB and their 
future plans in relation to social investment and 
business scaling. For those VCSEs that were 12 
months’ post-grant award the interviews also 
explored the long-term impacts of the BPB on 
their organisations (not just in relation to social 
investment). However, the interviews were semi-
structured in nature, which also allowed the 
participant VCSE to explore areas that they felt 
were important. 
The interview data gathered was analysed 
using a narrative approach, but in relation to 
the seven stages of the BPB. This narrative 
approach was used to gather a rich picture of 
how change occurred within each organisation 
as they went through the BPB and their 
experience of the BPB. In particular, the analysis 
sought to understand what elements of the 
BPB ‘enabled’ or ‘inhibited’ their investment 
readiness development, their knowledge of 
social investment and their future plans (Feldman 
et al., 2004).  As with Feldman et al. (2004), the 
approach to data analysis was both inductive 
and iterative. 
The website data gathered involved the 
collection of registered interest from VCSEs 
considering applying to the BPB. This stage of 
the quantitative data analysis led to the capture 
of data from 2,452 VCSEs. The second stage 
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of data analysis (the online diagnostic tool) resulted in a total of 1,125 VCSE research participants 
and (as of February 23rd 2018) 994 of these VCSEs had been assessed as eligible and completed/
booked their 1:1 Support Advisor Session with an advisor. The workshop social investment knowledge 
questionnaires have so far resulted in the capture of Time 1 and Time 2 data from 276 VCSEs.
7.2 – Appendix B: Workshop Knowledge Test Scores & Evaluation
Table 7.1 – VCSE Age, Finance & Staffing Data
SI Knowledge Score N Mean Score +/- t SD
Year 1
Time 1 58 78.5%
+8.1% 6.54***
13.0%
Time 2 58 86.6% 12.0%
Year 2
Time 1 183 76.6%
+9.5% 12.94***
14.7%
Time 2 183 86.1% 12.7%
Year 3
Time 1 276 75.7%
+10.2% 16.14***
14.4%
Time 2 276 85.9% 13.6%
Workshop Rating
N Score
I believe that this workshop has enhanced my knowledge of investment readiness and the social 
investment market
275 894.%
Nb. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. The totals presented here are cumulative for each year end i.e. the Year 3 figure represents the total number of 
workshop questionnaires collected across all three years.
7.3 – Appendix C: VCSE Demographic Data
Table 1 – VCSE Demographic Data
Demographic Variable N Mean Median SD Min. Max
VCSE age (years) 985 15.07 8.50 19.0 <1 118
Turnover 971 £1.23m £275,000 £5.72m £0 £156.1m
Net profitability 835 £43,353 £334 £198,443 £-79,924 £2.65m
Total assets 981 £1.03m £91,523 £4.88m £0 £87.69m
Total debt 932 £308,562 £14,742 £1.71m £0 £32.97m
Investment needs 988 £579,920 £250,000 £3.56m £0 £90m
Income diversity (% of income 
from top 2 customers)
940 66.4% 70% 26.2% 1% 100%
Public sector reliance (% of 
income from public sector)
786 52.0% 50.0% 32.0% 0% 100%
Staffing
FT 996 15 3 61 0 1,394
PT 994 14 4 50 0 890
Volunteers 992 174 10 2,665 0 75,425
Nb. N < 1,025 as some organisations did not complete all parts of the diagnostic tool.
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7.4 – Appendix D: Legal Organisational Structure
Table 7.3 – VCSE legal structures
Legal form N %
CLG 499 52.2
CIC-G 145 15.2
CIO 83 8.7
CIC-S 64 6.7
IPS 63 6.6
Private Company 44 4.6
Other 32 3.3
Unincorporated 26 2.7
Total 956 100
Charitable origins
Origin Yes No
Registered charity 557 (55.9%) 440 (44.1%)
Total 997
N < 1,025 as some organisations did not complete all parts of the diagnostic tool.
7.5 – Appendix E: VCSE Geographic Reach
Table 7.2 – VCSE Geographic Reach
Reach N %
Neighbourhood 27 2.8
Local Authority 369 38.4
Regional 281 29.2
Multi-regional 74 7.7
National 166 17.3
International 44 4.6
Total 961 100
N < 1,025 as some organisations did not complete all parts of the diagnostic tool.
7.6 – Appendix F: Women-, BME- & disabled-led VCSEs
Table 7.5 – Women-, BME- & disabled-led VCSEs
Type Yes No Total
Women-led 314 (31.5%) 682 (68.5%) 996
BME-led 141 (14.2%) 855 (85.8%) 996
Disabled-led 16 (1.7%) 950 (98.3%) 966
N < 1,025 as some organisations did not complete all parts of the diagnostic tool.
7.7 – Appendix G: Social Impact Measurement
The VCSE applicants were asked to rate their social impact measurement on an 11-point Likert scale in 
relation to the following four questions (scale end-points are in italicised brackets after the question):
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1. Report: How do your report on your achievements and impact? (0 = we don’t provide documents 
such as annual reports, other than what is included in our financial accounts; 10 = an annual 
independently verified statement of our social performance is always available on our website and 
promoted widely).
2. Fairness: What do you to ensure that the information you capture and report about your 
performance and social impact is fair? (0 = we don’t routinely collect information about our 
organisational performance; 10 = our social impact methodology routinely involves scrutiny and 
verification from an independent external body).
3. Performance/impact management: What methods does your organisation use to manage 
performance and/or measure impact? (0 = we do not have a formal method in place to track 
performance and measure impact; 10 = we use an established and externally developed social 
impact methodology, which is fully embedded in our overall organisational systems).
4. Vision: Does your organisation have a clear vision for change and the impact you are trying to 
achieve? (0 = we don’t yet have a clear vision of what our organisation is trying to achieve in the 
longer term; 10 = we regularly review our vision, mission and objectives and the board and staff are 
all aware and signed up to them).
Table 7.6a – Social impact
Question Year N Mean SD
Report
Overall 995 47.6% 24.6%
Year 1 272 46.7% 22.5%
Year 2 276 51.7% 31.4%
Year 3 235 43.5% 21.1%
Year 4 212 48.0% 20.3%
Fairness
Overall 995 48.5% 20.8%
Year 1 272 52.2% 18.7%
Year 2 276 41.5% 24.8%
Year 3 235 49.4% 18.7%
Year 4 212 52.1% 17.1%
Performance management
Overall 995 49.1% 21.2%
Year 1 272 51.5% 20.6%
Year 2 276 44.9% 23.6%
Year 3 235 49.1% 20.1%
Year 4 212 51.4% 18.9%
Vision
Overall 995 62.4% 22.2%
Year 1 272 67.5% 20.4%
Year 2 276 50.6% 24.2%
Year 3 235 66.7% 19.0%
Year 4 212 66.6% 19.2%
 NB. Likert-scale responses are represented here as average (mean) percentages.
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Table 7.6b – MIAA Longitudinal Scores
Factor N Mean t SD
MIAA score (Time 1)
174
18.61
17.8***
3.25
MIAA score (Time 2) 20.75 2.83
Nb. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Paired-sample t-tests were undertaken in order to test the longitudinal change. MIAA scores are out of 30.
7.8 – Appendix H: VCSE Investment Readiness Perceptions
In calculating the investment readiness of VCSE applicants, data was collected in the Diagnostic Tool 
in relation to VCSE perceptions of their organisational capabilities. Specifically, the areas that were 
explored were:
• The people in the organisation: Staff, volunteer and senior management team skillsets.
• Product(s) and customers: Product clarity, market competition, customer base, organisational 
adaptability and networks.
• Impact: How organisations measure social impact, track record, community engagement and 
organisational capacity (in relation to impact).
• Finances: Financial management, accounting practices and financial forecasting.
VCSEs were asked to rate their abilities against specific questions within these four areas. They rated 
themselves on an 11-point Likert scale that ranged from 0-10. Each question provided explanations 
detailing what each end of the Likert scale related to. The answers provided for these given areas 
were then calculated to produce final scores across five areas (Governance and leadership; Financial 
performance; Financial control; Quality and impact; and Market potential). These five final scores 
were then combined to provide an overall total score relating to a VCSEs investment readiness (as a 
percentage). This process was undertaken by VCSEs when they completed their online DT.
Table 7.7a – Online DT final scores 
Factor N Mean (T1) SD
Year 1
Investment readiness score 220 59.3% 12.8%
Year 2
Investment readiness score 277 49.5% 21.5%
Year 3
Investment readiness score 235 57.3% 11.6%
Year 4
Investment readiness score 212 59.5% 10.4%
Overall
Investment readiness score 944 56% 15.8%
N < 1,025 for the overall data as some organisations did not complete all parts of the diagnostic tool and so a final overall score could not be calculated.
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Table 7.7b – Online DT Scores Comparison by Year
Factor N Mean F SD
Investment readiness score (Year 1) 220 59.3%
24.9***
12.8%
Investment readiness score (Year 2) 277 49.5% 21.5%
Investment readiness score (Year 3) 235 57.3% 11.6%
Investment readiness score (Year 4) 212 59.5% 10.4%
Nb. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. One-way ANOVAs were undertaken in order to test for the annual differences. N < 1,025 for the overall data as 
some organisations did not complete all parts of the diagnostic tool
Table 7.7c – Charitable Status Online DT Comparison
VCSE N Mean F SD
Charitable Status
Registered Charity 513 58.5%
29.3***
15.4%
Not Registered Charity 429 53.0% 15.7%
BME-led
BME-led 136 52.9%
6.1*
17.8%
Not BME-led 805 56.5% 15.4%
Nb. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. One-way ANOVAs were undertaken in order to test for the organisational differences. N < 1,025 for the overall 
data as some organisations did not complete all parts of the diagnostic tool
7.9 – Appendix I: Grant Awards Data
Table 7.8 – Grant Awards Data
Variable N Mean Median SD Min. Max
Preliminary Grant Awards Made 255 £27,128 £28,499 £3,532 £4,500 £40,400
Investment Plan Grant Awards Made 64 £41,092 £43,312 £8,259 £19,848 £55,020
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7.10 – Appendix J: Grant Application Rejection Reasons
Table 7.9 – Grant Application Rejection Reasons
Rejection Reason
Prelim Grants Invest Plan Grants Total
Variable Specific
Poor or unclear corporate governance/no 
plans to address
19 7 26
Poor description and understanding of  
market position/no plans to address
35 11 46
Track record not related to future work/no 
explanation
14 6 20
Organisation at too early stage 23 3 26
Poor or unclear  financial history/no plans 
to address
32 8 40
Poor or unclear financial controls/no plans 
to address
8 0 8
Insufficiently relates to 1:1 report 10 2 12
Poor breakdown of activity 21 8 29
Work unrelated to investment readiness 29 8 37
Work not sufficiently justified 27 13 40
Unclear investment deal (IP Only)  25 25
Unclear mission/no plans to address 3 1 4
Poor or unclear understanding of 
beneficiaries/no plans to address
10 4 14
Unclear explanation of social impact to 
date/no plans to address
36 13 49
Poor breakdown of costs 19 9 28
Poor basis for costs 34 23 57
Unclear relationship to readiness plan 19 6 25
Costs unrelated to investment readiness 17 8 25
Totals 356 155 511
Nb. As 4 separate reasons can be given for an application rejection, the theoretical total for the data held on 383 rejections is 1,532. However, not all VCSEs are 
given 4 rejection reasons, hence N here equals 511.
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7.11 – Appendix K: VCSE Semi-Structured Interview Questions
1. Will you please tell me a bit about your SE and describe your role?
a. Social mission?
b. Entrepreneur/CEO?
c. Legal and governance structure?
d. Future?
2. What are your main sources of income?
a. Sectors:
i. Private sector.
ii. Public sector.
iii. Donative.
b. Have those sources of income changed since you started up and if so how?
3. Why did you apply to the Big Potential programme?
4. What has been your experience of the Big Potential programme?
a. Online application?
b. 1:1 Diagnostic?
c. Mentoring and partner organisation?
d. Final grant application?
5. What was your knowledge of investment readiness prior to engaging with Big Potential?
a. How has this changed?
6. Did you engage with the Big Potential workshops and if so what was your experience of them?
7. What do you see happening with your venture over the next 12 months?
a. Expansion?
b. Seek further investment?
c. Social impact?
8. How has the Big Potential programme changed your organisation?
9. Did you encounter any barriers/problems with the Big Potential programme?
10. What do you think are the main barriers to you seeking investment from the private sector?
a. Has the Big Potential programme helped with any of this?
11. Is there anything else that I haven’t asked that you think is important or wish to add?
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7.12 – Appendix L: Provider Semi-structured Interview Questions
1. Will you please tell me a bit about your organisation?
a. Social mission?
b. Experience/history?
2. Why did you become a provider for BP?
3. What has been your experience of the BIG Potential programme?
a. Mentoring and partner organisation?
b. Final grant applications?
c. Post-grant application?
4. What was your knowledge of the social investment sector like prior to becoming a Provider on BIG 
Potential?
a. How has this changed?
5. Did you encounter any barriers/problems with the BIG Potential programme?
a. What could be improved?
6. How do you believe that BP has helped the VCSEs that you have supported?
a. Investment readiness?
b. Business development?
c. Social impact?
7. What support have you provided to VCSEs during their applications?
a. What is most important area in your perception?
8. Can you tell me about a specific case-study (if applicable)?
9. Is there anything else that I haven’t asked that you think is important or wish to add?
53
7.13 – Appendix M: Panel Semi-Structured Interview Questions
1. Will you please tell me a bit about yourself?
a. Professional experience.
b. Current role.
2. Why have you become a panel member for BP?
3. What has been your experience of the BIG Potential programme Panel meetings?
a. Application quality?
b. Assessment?
c. Grant awardee updates?
4. Did you see any barriers/problems with the BIG Potential programme?
a. What could be improved?
5. How do you believe that BP has helped VCSEs?
a. Awardees?
b. Generally?
6. What do you think the impact of the BP is on the sector?
a. Business planning?
b. Investment readiness?
c. Social impact?
7. Is there anything else that I haven’t asked that you think is important or wish to add?
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